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Chapter 01: This paper explores the firm’s pricing-setting behavior through the lens of 
market structure and exchange rate pass-through. The basis for this chapter stems from a 
four-tiered nested constant elasticity of substitution demand function, where firms have 
non-negligible sector and subsector market shares. This model allows the firm to compete 
against firms within the same subsector, as well as against firms within other subsectors. 
From this model, I identify three propositions. First, a u-shaped price response in both 
sector and subsector market shares to an exchange rate movement. Second, a hump-
shaped price response in subsector market share and a u-shaped price response in sector 
market share to a subsector price change. Third, an increasing price response in subsector 
market share and a hump-shaped price response in sector market share to a sector price 
change. The findings in the surrounding literature provide evidence in support of this model. 
Chapter 02: The United States represents the largest single importer of goods and services 
in the world. Throughout the Post-World War II trade era, economists have observed a 
disconnect between U.S. exchange rates and import prices. This paper seeks to explain 
that puzzle using the market structure and spillover effects. This chapter presents a multi-
country dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model, where firms have non-negligible 
market shares. From this model, I find two predictions. First, a U.S. trade partner will 
decrease its import price in response to a real exchange rate movement. Second, a U.S. 
trade partner will increase its import price in response to a competitor’s price increase. I 
provide evidence in support of these predictions using a Bayesian vector autoregression 
and impulse responses. From these empirical results, I then calibrate the theoretical model. 
Chapter 03: This paper examines the impact of U.S. monetary policy on corporate 
revenues by sector. I use a structural vector autoregression model to estimate each 
sector’s sensitivity to monetary tightening. This model includes a dynamic factor to capture 
the spillover effects of growth in real output from other sectors. The dataset uses the Global 
Industry Classification Standard, which groups firms by principal business activity and 
revenue. The findings reveal a heterogeneous response across sectors to a one-unit 
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A General Theory on Market Structure and Price-Setting 
 
1.1 Introduction 
The firm’s price-setting behavior is an essential part of explaining global trade imbalances 
and business cycle co-movements in international economics. Central to this topic is how 
an exporting firm will adjust its price in response to an exchange rate movement. In the 
aggregate, such firm-level decisions will determine the rate of exchange rate pass-
through (ERPT). 
This chapter focuses on the role of market structure in determining import prices. 
To explain the exporting firm’s price-setting behavior, I develop a comparative statics 
model with three propositions. I then extend my analysis to consider the implications of 
this model on the surrounding literature. The existing literature’s findings strongly support 
the proposed model. Together, this evidence provides new insight into the firm’s behavior. 
 To begin, ERPT measures the responsiveness of international prices to a change 
in exchange rates. It represents the elasticity of the home country’s import price with 
respect to the home country’s relative price of foreign currency. As the home currency 
appreciates against the foreign currency, it should be able to purchase a proportional 
amount more in foreign goods. However, works as early as Kreinin (1977) found evidence 
of incomplete pass-through and reasoned that the root cause stemmed from the 
incomplete price adjustments by firms. To explain the disconnect between import prices 
and exchange rates, Froot and Klemperer (1989) turned to monopolistic competition 
models and emphasized the role of market structure. 
 This paper builds upon works examining the role of market structure in determining 
the firm’s optimal price response to an exchange rate movement. Although I present the 
model in the context of international economics and ERPT, it extends to a generalized 
theory on the firm’s price-setting behavior. Namely, how a firm’s market power affects its 
response to a change within its own market or a change within a related market. 
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To understand the basic principle behind my comparative statics model, consider 
a simple example of an oenophile and vintner. Suppose that an oenophile finds themself 
in the wine aisle at a local liquor store. As they stare into the pinot noir section, initially, 
they contemplate a choice from among the available bottles. Yet, after several minutes, 
they expand their field of vision to consider other red wine varietals. 
This decision-making process demonstrates that a vintner competes in an uneven 
multi-dimensional field of competition. In one dimension, a pinot noir vintner is competing 
against other pinot noir vintners. In another dimension, a pinot noir vintner is also 
competing more broadly against red varietal vintners. Put another way, the oenophile has 
preferences within the set of pinot noir wines, with a degree of substitutability between 
bottles. Likewise, the oenophile has preferences across the entire set of red wines, with 
a different degree of substitutability between varietals. This reasoning can extend to 
additional fields of competition, such as alcoholic beverages, or beverages in general. 
The variation in substitutability between the types of wine implies that the demand 
elasticity faced by a vintner is multi-dimensional. That is, when a pinot noir vintner sets a 
price, it must consider the prices of other pinot noirs, as well as the prices of other red 
wines. Conversely, when the oenophile selects a bottle of wine, they consider the price 
of pinot noirs, as well as the price of other red wines. Key to this example, the vintner’s 
price depends on its respective market power in both the pinot noir and red wine markets. 
The more competition the vintner faces in each of these markets, the lower their markup. 
The motivation for this chapter stems from the prevailing literature that developed 
from the steady appreciation of the U.S. dollar during the early 1980s.1 During this period, 
economists observed a disconnect between the value of foreign currencies and U.S. 
import prices (i.e., the pass-through puzzle). The era’s literature looked for market barriers 
and signs of strategic behavior to explain the inconsistency between economic theory 
and practice. Notably, Krugman (1987) found strategic pricing behavior by German 
manufacturers and coined the term pricing-to-market (PTM). 
 
1 The U.S. real effective exchange rate increased by 41.9% from 1980 to 1985. Data Source: 
International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics. Data Identification: PX.REX.REER. 
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 During that same period, Dornbusch (1987) explored several imperfect 
competition models to explain the lack of full international price adjustment. Of interest to 
this chapter, his variation of the Dixit–Stiglitz model assumes that each firm had a non-
zero or non-negligible market share and faces a downward-sloping demand curve. This 
market share determines the firm’s demand elasticity, its markup, and any subsequent 
price adjustments. Notice the subtle but important distinction between firm size and its 
market share. A firm can have substantial revenues and be consider large in size, yet it 
may still account for a small share of a given market. 
Feenstra, Gagnon, and Knetter (1996) examined the world automobile market 
through this lens of non-negligible country market share in a related work. They surmised 
that an exporting country’s pass-through elasticity was u-shaped in market share. Why u-
shaped? Because non-negligible market share creates a conduit in which a country’s 
price adjustment affects the sector price and vice versa. This feedback occurs through 
the country’s demand elasticity for that given sector. 
Kimball (1995) explains this phenomenon as the superelasticity of demand, also 
known as the elasticity of the demand elasticity. Any change in the firm’s price affects the 
sector price. Likewise, any change in the sector price affects the firm’s price. This 
mechanism works across the firm’s demand elasticity. It generates variable markups, in 
which small and large firms in terms of market share find it optimal to pass through most 
of the cost because they have no market share to lose or gain. However, medium-sized 
firms in terms of market share reduce their price adjustment to avoid losing their market 
share. Hence, the u-shaped price response in market share. 
Important gains in our understanding of the role of market structure in ERPT have 
been made possible by the availability of large, disaggregated datasets, such as the 
goods-level import price data from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). Under the 
heterogeneous firm model of Atkeson and Burstein (2008), Auer and Schoenle (2016) 
use this BLS data to estimate ERPT in two ways. First, how firms respond to an exchange 
rate movement. Second, how firms respond to a competitor’s price change. In addition to 
finding a u-shaped price response in market share to an exchange rate movement, they 
find a hump-shaped price response in market share to a competitor’s price change. 
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This hump-shaped response corresponds to firms with small and large market 
shares not adjusting their prices in response to the competitor’s price change. In contrast, 
a firm with a medium-sized market share increases its price while maintaining its market 
share. As detailed in Penning (2017), this hump-shaped price response represents an 
indirect and somewhat overlooked factor that affects international prices. Models that 
ignore this strategic reaction by competitor firms overestimate the individual firm’s direct 
price adjustment. For instance, Campa and Goldberg (2005) find a long-run aggregate 
ERPT of 0.42 for U.S. import prices. Without accounting for this indirect price adjustment, 
the incomplete pass-through suggests that the individual firm’s direct adjustment is even 
smaller than previously thought. 
To determine the firm’s price response, this paper builds on the theoretical 
underpinning of Atkeson and Burstein (2008), which relies on a three-tiered nested 
constant elasticity of substitution (CES) demand structure. These tiers consist of a 
composite country good, a sector composite good, and a varietal or product level good. I 
extend that approach by adding a fourth tier, in which firms have a non-negligible market 
share at both the sector and a newly defined subsector market levels. This new tier within 
the nested-CES model results in a new feedback channel. Under this extension, the firm’s 
non-negligible sector and subsector market shares influence its demand elasticity and, 
subsequently, its markup. This extension ultimately unfolds the ERPT elasticity into a 
three-dimensional space, with the ability to unfold into 𝑁𝑁 dimensions. 
Hardy, Littlewood, and Pólya (1934) first developed the mathematical form of the 
CES function, which Arrow et al. (1961) later introduced into the world of economics. The 
success of the CES function is widely attributed to its expressive elegance and 
mathematical tractability. The function’s capacity to model markets with a broad range of 
characteristics—on both the consumer and producer sides—proves indispensable in 
modern economics. In one extreme, the CES function reduces to the Cobb-Douglas 
function, while in the other extreme, it simplifies to the Leontief function. From perfect 
substitutes to perfect complements, the CES function provides the flexibility and balance 
to model much of the economic phenomenon in the world. 
5 
 
 Despite the immense contribution that the CES function continues to make to 
economics, it has limitations. Matsuyama and Ushchev (2017) provide one such critique, 
noting they identify that the CES demand function requires that if one good is essential to 
the household, then all other goods must be essential. At the heart of their critique is the 
elasticity of substitution parameter. In the CES demand function, this parameter is the 
same for all goods. Thus, the degree of substitutability is the same for all goods. 
 This restrictive property of the elasticity of substitution parameter underlies the very 
mechanism that makes the CES function desirable; however, it also leads to some less 
desirable implications. For example, consider a CES demand function that includes the 
goods of wine, beer, and cheese. This functional form implies that the consumer would 
have the same substitutability between wine and beer as they do for wine and cheese. 
Yet, intuitively, the elasticity of substitution between wine and beer should be larger 
relative to the elasticity of substitution of wine and cheese. 
The nested-CES function overcomes this issue of degree of substitutability 
between different goods (or inputs when modeling supply). To understand this nesting 
extension, consider Anderson and Moroney (1994). They start with a standard CES 
supply function and then define each input as the product of another CES supply function. 
Thus, the top-level inputs each represent a composite of a nested set of inputs. This 
structure allows for differences the degree of substitutability between inputs within one 
nest and inputs in another nest. 
Beyond allowing for variation in elasticity of substitution, the nested-CES structure 
provides additional desirable properties. Atkeson and Burstein (2008) explore one such 
case by extending the Helpman and Krugman (1985) imperfect competition model. Their 
three-tier nested-CES model generates variable markups based on a firm’s sector market 
share, where a nest represents a sector market. In Atkeson and Burstein’s model, firms 
compete under perfect competition at the composite good or top level. Thus, that model 
represents a collection of many sector markets. While firms interact with other firms within 
their sector, they do not interact with other sectors. 
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This paper introduces a fourth tier between the sector and varietal good levels, 
which I refer to as the subsector level. By allowing firms to have non-negligible sector and 
subsector market shares, a firm competes with firms in its subsector, as well as with firms 
in other subsectors. Although this paper primarily focuses on the firm’s price-setting 
behavior through the lens of ERPT, the general theory holds in a much broader context. 
Thus, this paper contributes to the literature by providing a new comparative statics 
framework to capture the relationship between goods in different markets. 
 A nested-CES demand function with non-negligible firm sector and subsector 
market shares provides three key insights into the firm’s price-setting behavior. First, a u-
shaped price response in both sector and subsector market share to a change in 
exchange rate. Second, a hump-shaped price response in subsector market share and a 
u-shaped price response in sector market share to an increase in subsector price. Third, 
an increasing price response in subsector market share and a hump-shaped response in 
sector market share to an increase in sector price. 
Before moving forward, I acknowledge the importance of surrounding works on 
ERPT. Although this paper does not address currency choice in international contract 
pricing, Gopinath, Itskhoki, Rigobon (2010) show that it plays a significant role in 
determining pass-through when comparing U.S. dollar to non-U.S. dollar transactions. 
Likewise, this paper does not fully account for the role of global supply chains. Amiti, 
Itskhoki, and Konings (2014) show that imported input goods are not subject to the same 
exchange rate exposure as domestic goods and have different pass-through rates. 
Finally, unlike Melitz and Ottaviano (2008), this paper does not address the importance 
of firm productivity in shaping a market’s size and toughness. Each of these works and 
their underlying methodologies play an important role in telling the complete ERPT story. 
In section two, this paper presents the theoretical model that unfolds the ERPT 
elasticities. It includes subsections on the household’s problem, the firm’s problem, and 
the three propositions. Section three of this paper presents a proposed empirical 
framework and provides existing evidence in support for this model. Finally, section four 
concludes. Note that all figures are at the end of the chapter, followed by any technical 
derivations in the appendices. 
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1.2 Theoretical Framework 
This section presents a four-tiered nested-CES demand model, where firms have non-
negligible sector and subsector market shares. The firm’s non-zero market share 
corresponds to its market power and demand elasticity. As the firm’s market share 
increases, so too does its market power and the steepness of its demand curve. Before I 
present the model, let us consider several preliminary questions. 
First, why include non-negligible sector and subsector market shares? Recall the 
oenophile and vintner example. The primary mechanism explored in this paper is the 
multi-dimensional fields of competition. At a subsector level, the oenophile decides 
between different bottles of pinot noir. At a sector level, the oenophile decides between 
bottles of pinot noir and bottles of other red varietals. The vintner’s non-zero sector and 
subsector market shares determine its relative market power. 
 Second, why include four tiers within the proposed demand specification? I start 
with a varietal good level, which represents the product produced by an individual firm. 
Next, I include the sector and subsector levels. These tiers provide a means to address 
the primary research on the role of market structure in determining ERPT. Finally, I 
include a composite good level, which represents the aggregate of the sector goods. 
Thus, to capture these multi-dimensional fields of competition, I need at least four tiers. 
Third, why rely on the CES demand specification? Under the CES demand 
structure, households have homothetic preferences. Simply put, households with different 
income levels demand goods in the same proportions. This property produces highly 
tractable computational solutions solved in polynomial time. Note that this demand 
structure imposes a less realistic restriction. As Matsuyama and Ushchev (2017) detail, a 
CES demand function requires that all other goods must be essential if one good is 
essential to the household. Alternatively, I could model demand using a transcendental 
logarithmic function, such as in Naknoi (2015), which allows for a blend of complement 
and substitute goods. Likewise, Ottaviano, Tabuchi, and Thisse (2002) show improved 
empirical results with a quadratic utility function relative to a CES demand function; 
however, these approaches face the tradeoff of less tractable models. 
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1.2.1 The Household’s Problem: Demand and Market Clearing 
On the demand side, I extend the original Dixit–Stiglitz monopolistic competition 
framework. This adaptation follows closely to the nested-CES demand of Atkeson and 
Burstein (2008), where the representative household faces a four-tiered nested-CES 
demand function—a variation on the original Armington aggregator (Armington, 1969): 











where 𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛 denotes the composite consumption good produced by country 𝑚𝑚 and 
consumed by country 𝑛𝑛. 𝜂𝜂 denotes the elasticity of substitution between country origin of 
composite consumption goods. 𝛼𝛼𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛 denotes the country preference weight for goods 
produced in country 𝑚𝑚 and consumed by country 𝑛𝑛. 
Next, I define the composite consumption index, comprised of 𝑘𝑘 ∈ 𝐾𝐾𝑛𝑛 sector goods 
produced by country 𝑚𝑚 and consumed by country 𝑛𝑛: 









where 𝐶𝐶𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛 denotes the composite good of sector 𝑘𝑘, and 𝜃𝜃 denotes the elasticity of 
substitution between sector goods. 
Similarly, I define the sector composite good, comprised of 𝑙𝑙 ∈ 𝐿𝐿𝑘𝑘 subsector goods 
produced in country 𝑚𝑚 and consumed by country 𝑛𝑛: 









where 𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛 denotes the composite good of subsector 𝑙𝑙, and 𝛿𝛿 denotes the elasticity of 




The fourth and final tier within this nested demand structure consists of 𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝐽𝐽𝑙𝑙 
differentiated varietal goods, produced by monopolistically competitive firms: 









where 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛 denotes the varietal good 𝑖𝑖, and 𝛾𝛾 denotes the elasticity of substitution 
between varietal goods. 
As shown by the derivation in Appendix 1.A.1, the optimal consumption of the 
varietal good equals: 











denotes the index price of subsector 𝑙𝑙. 
Likewise, the optimal consumption condition of the subsector good follows the 
familiar structure of Equation 1.05: 










1−𝛿𝛿 and denotes the index price of sector 𝑘𝑘. As noted, 
Appendix 1.A.1 provides the full derivation of the representative household’s problem. 
Moving upward through the nested-CES structure, the optimal consumption 
condition of the sector good equals: 










1−𝜃𝜃 and denotes the composite consumption price of goods 
produced in country 𝑚𝑚 and consumed in country 𝑛𝑛. 
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At the country-specific composite consumption level, the optimal consumption of 
goods produced by country 𝑚𝑚 and consumed by country 𝑛𝑛 equals: 






where 𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛 ≡ [∑ 𝛼𝛼𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛(𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛)1−𝜂𝜂𝑁𝑁𝑚𝑚=1 ]
1
1−𝜂𝜂 and denotes the consumer price index (CPI). 
On the supply side, each of the 𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝑁𝑁𝑘𝑘 monopolistically competitive firms produce 
a differentiated varietal good, 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖,𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡, at a constant marginal cost. This condition holds 
across all 𝑚𝑚 ∈ 𝑁𝑁 countries, where price discrimination prevents arbitrage across the world 
goods market. As detailed in Atkeson and Burstein (2008), PTM requires such a wedge 
in international prices. Thus, there is no singular world market price; rather, each firm sets 
its price based on its unique demand elasticity in a given country. 
The real goods market-clearing condition at the varietal level equals: 
∑ 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑁𝑁𝑛𝑛=1 = 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚, where the summation of the total consumption of varietal 𝑖𝑖 across 
all 𝑛𝑛 ∈ 𝑁𝑁 countries equal its total production. This clearing condition must hold across all 
𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝐽𝐽𝑙𝑙 varietal goods. Additionally, the total consumption of a subsector good equals its 
total production: ∑ 𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑁𝑁𝑛𝑛=1 = 𝑌𝑌𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚 and holds across all 𝑙𝑙 ∈ 𝐿𝐿𝑘𝑘 subsector goods. Finally, 
the total consumption of a composite good equals its total production: ∑ 𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑁𝑁𝑛𝑛=1 = 𝑌𝑌𝑚𝑚 and 
holds across all 𝑛𝑛 ∈ 𝑁𝑁 countries. 
 Before moving forward to the firm’s problem, note the following assumption on the 
tiered elasticities of substitution: 𝛾𝛾 > 𝛿𝛿 > 𝜃𝜃 > 1. This restriction implies that consumers 
can more easily substitute between varietal goods than subsector goods. Additionally, 
consumers can more easily substitute between subsector goods than sector goods. For 
example, consider two adult beverage varietals, Budweiser and Heineken, and then 
consider two subsector goods, adult beverages and sports drinks. Under this restriction, 
consumers can more easily substitute from Budweiser to Heineken than from adult 
beverages to sports drinks. Similarly, consider two types of sector goods, beverages and 
clothing. Consumers can more easily substitute from adult beverages to sports drinks 
than from beverages to clothing. 
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1.2.2 The Firm’s Problem: Price-Setting and Pass-Through 
In this setup, each firm maximizes its profit by choosing the amount of labor to hire and 
setting its optimal varietal good price. Although the firm has a non-negligible size in the 
final goods market, I treat each country’s labor market as perfectly competitive, where 
workers can freely move between industries within a country. 
To begin, the firm sets its price each period to maximize profit for each of its 𝑛𝑛 ∈ 𝑁𝑁 
markets: 
𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛 = max𝑃𝑃i,l,k,mn
��𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛 −𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛�𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛� (1.09) 
where 𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛 denotes the constant marginal cost for firm 𝑖𝑖. 
Using the real goods market clearing condition from the previous subsection, the 









where each firm has non-negligible sector and subsector market shares. This market 
power implies that a firm has influence on these higher-order prices. 






where 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛 = 𝛾𝛾�1 − 𝜔𝜔𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙 � + 𝛿𝛿�𝜔𝜔𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙 − 𝜔𝜔𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘 � + 𝜃𝜃𝜔𝜔𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘  and denotes the 






𝑚𝑚=1  and denotes the firm’s 










Notice that the firm cannot have a greater sector market share than its subsector 
market share (i.e., 𝜔𝜔𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘,𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘 ≤ 𝜔𝜔𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘,𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙 ). From this fact, consider the firm’s demand 
elasticity under three scenarios. First, a firm with negligible market shares at the sector 
and subsector levels would face a demand elasticity of 𝛾𝛾. Second, a firm that controls the 
entire market share at the subsector level but has a negligible sector market share would 
face a demand elasticity of 𝛿𝛿. Third, a firm that controls the entire market shares at both 
the sector and subsector levels would face a demand elasticity of 𝜃𝜃. This assumption of 
𝛾𝛾 > 𝛿𝛿 > 𝜃𝜃 > 1 implies that as the firm’s market share increases, demand for its goods 
becomes more inelastic. Note that this condition is sufficient but not necessary to ensure 
that 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛 > 1 and firms face a downward sloping demand curve. This third assumption 
also restricts the general shape of the firm’s price response for each proposition. 
 Since the firm’s price affects both the sector price and the subsector price, it follows 
from Kimball’s superelasticity that these prices would affect the firm’s price. Any change 
to the sector price or subsector price would affect the firm’s demand elasticity and elicit a 
price response. To pin down the firm’s price responsiveness to changes in either of these 
prices, begin by taking the log difference of the firm’s price: 




�(1 − 𝛾𝛾)(𝛾𝛾 − 𝛿𝛿)𝜔𝜔𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙 − (𝛾𝛾 − 𝛿𝛿)(𝛿𝛿 − 𝜃𝜃)𝜔𝜔𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘 � 
Γ𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘 ≡ �𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛�
−1(1 − 𝛿𝛿)(𝛿𝛿 − 𝜃𝜃)𝜔𝜔𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘  
where ?̂?𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛 − ?̂?𝑝𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘,𝑛𝑛 denotes the relative subsector price, and ?̂?𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛 − ?̂?𝑝𝑘𝑘,𝑛𝑛 denotes the 
relative sector price. 
In part, Equation 1.12 identifies the three channels through which the firm’s price 
works. First, through the relative subsector price, which follows from the partial subsector 
price elasticity of the varietal price. Second, through the relative sector price, which 




 To better understand the surrounding issue of price sensitivity, consider Klenow 
and Willis (2007). They explore price sensitivity in the more generalized framework of 
micro real rigidities. Their work finds that responsiveness corresponds to the degree of 
concavity of the firm’s profit function with respect to its relative price. In this model, take 
notice that the firm’s markup sensitivity is strictly increasing in both sector and subsector 
market shares; however, the firm’s overall reaction is non-monotonic in these market 
shares. Parallel to the findings of Auer and Schoenle (2016), this non-monotonicity in 
market shares stems from the effect of each firm’s price on the sector and subsector 
prices. 
To understand how this mechanism works, this paper now examines in detail each 
price transmission channel and the firm’s corresponding price sensitivity. This analysis 
lends important new insights into the firm’s price-setting behavior and three propositions. 
First, I must define the sector and subsector price indices: 
Definition 01: ?̂?𝑝𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘,𝑛𝑛𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿 ≡ �1 − 𝜔𝜔𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙 �





𝑚𝑚=1  and denotes the change 
in the rest of subsector (ROL) price. This price represents a normalized index of weighted 
prices in subsector 𝑙𝑙 other than firm 𝑖𝑖. That is, it is a price index of competitor firms within 
the subsector. 
Definition 02: ?̂?𝑝𝑛𝑛𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐾𝐾 ≡ �1 − 𝜔𝜔𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘 �







𝑚𝑚=1  and denotes the 
change in the rest of sector (ROK) price. This price represents a normalized index of 
weighted prices in sector 𝑘𝑘 other than firm 𝑖𝑖. Similar to the Definition 01, it is a price index 
of competitor firms within the sector. 
Using the above definitions, I solve Equation 1.12 in terms of the firm’s price and 
find: 
?̂?𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛 =
−Γ𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙 �1−𝜔𝜔𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙 �?̂?𝑝𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘,𝑛𝑛𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿 − Γ𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘 �1−𝜔𝜔𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘 �?̂?𝑝𝑘𝑘,𝑛𝑛𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐾𝐾 +𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚�𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛
1 − Γ𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙 �1−𝜔𝜔𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙 � − Γ𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘 �1−𝜔𝜔𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘 �
 (1.13) 
where the percentage change in the firm’s price depends on its marginal cost, the ROL 
price, and the ROK price. From Equation 1.13, this paper summarizes the firm’s price 
response to each of these channels with the following propositions: 
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= �1 − Γ𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙 �1 − 𝜔𝜔𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙 � − Γ𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘 �1 − 𝜔𝜔𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘 ��
−1 (1.14) 
Equation 1.14 isolates the firm’s price response to a change in marginal cost. 
As shown in Figure 1.1, the firm’s price elasticity depends on both its sector and 
subsector market shares. As these shares vary, so too does the firm’s response to its 
marginal cost. The triangular sail shape of Figure 1.1 results from the fact that a firm can 
never have a greater sector market share than subsector market share. To understand 
the firm’s behavior, let us examine cross-sections of each market share. 
For part one, consider a cross-sectional slice through the sector market share. This 
cross-section reflects the u-shaped price response in sector market share described by 
earlier works. A firm with a negligible subsector market share would pass the cost to the 
consumers because it has no market share to lose. A monopoly that controls the entire 
subsector market would also pass the cost to the consumers because it has no subsector 
competitors or subsector market share to lose. In contrast, a firm with a non-negligible 
subsector market share would only partially pass the cost to consumers because it would 
not want to lose any of its subsector market share. Thus, as you move along the 
continuum of the subsector market share, the firm’s price response forms a u shape. 
For part two, consider a cross-sectional slice through the subsector market share. 
Similar to the sector cross-section, there is a u-shaped price response in sector market 
share. A firm with a negligible sector market share would pass the cost to the consumers 
because it has no market share to lose. A monopoly that controls the entire sector market 
would also pass the cost to the consumers because it has no sector competitors or sector 
market share to lose. In contrast, a firm with a non-negligible sector market share would 
only partially pass the cost to consumers because it would not want to lose any of its 
sector market share. This u-shaped price response holds for firms that have subsector 
monopolies. Again, a firm that has a non-negligible sector market share would adjust its 
pass-through to avoid losing any of that market share—even with a subsector monopoly. 
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−Γ𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙 �1 − 𝜔𝜔𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙 �
1 − Γ𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙 �1 − 𝜔𝜔𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙 � − Γ𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘 �1 − 𝜔𝜔𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘 �
 (1.15) 
As shown in Figure 1.2, the firm’s price response to an increase in its ROL price forms a 
triangular sail draped in a saddle-like shape in market shares. Again, to understand the 
firm’s behavior, let us examine cross-sections in each market share. 
For part one, consider a cross-sectional slice through the sector market share. This 
cross-section reflects the hump-shaped price response in subsector market share 
described by Auer and Schoenle (2016). A firm with a negligible subsector market share 
would not react because it has no market power. A subsector monopoly would not react 
to a change in its ROL price because the ROL has a negligible market share and does 
not affect the firm’s demand elasticity. In contrast, a firm with a non-negligible subsector 
market share would react to a change in its ROL price because it could increase its price 
while maintaining its subsector market share. 
For part two, consider a cross-sectional slice through the firm’s subsector market 
share. The pricing behavior most notably reflects a u-shaped price response in market 
share for the middle three quintiles, while the lower and upper quintiles are much less 
pronounced. The middle three quintiles’ behavior follows from the fact that a firm with a 
non-negligible sector market share would reduce its reaction to its ROL price to avoid 
losing any of its sector market share. 










−Γ𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘 �1 − 𝜔𝜔𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘 �
1 − Γ𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙 �1 − 𝜔𝜔𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙 � − Γ𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘 �1 − 𝜔𝜔𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘 �
 (1.16) 
As shown in Figure 1.3, the firm’s price response to an increase in its ROK price forms a 
cresting wave-like shape in market shares. As before, let us examine both cross-sections 
to understand the firm’s behavior. 
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For part one, consider a cross-sectional slice through the firm’s subsector market 
share. This cross-section reflects the hump-shaped price response in sector market share 
akin to the hump-shaped response in subsector market from the previous change in ROL 
price. Neither the firm with a negligible sector market share nor the firm with a sector 
monopoly would react to the change in the ROK price. In contrast, a firm with a non-
negligible sector market share would react to a change in its ROK price because it could 
increase its price while maintaining its sector market share. 
For part two, consider a cross-sectional slice through the firm’s sector market 
share. The figure shows an increasing price response in market share for the middle three 
quintiles, while the lower and upper quintiles are less pronounced. The middle quintiles’ 
behavior follows from the fact that as a firm’s subsector market share increases, the firm 
becomes less and less concerned with losing its subsector market share. Unlike the ROL 
price, the ROK price change affects the firm and its competitors simultaneously and in an 
identical fashion. Thus, the firm can increase its price while maintaining its subsector 
market share. 
These propositions describe the firm’s price channels, but this specification runs 
into the same conundrum as Auer and Schoenle (2016). The firm conditions its price 
response on a set of unobserved cost movements that comprise either a ROL price 
change or a ROK price change. However, the firm likely experiences its own cost change 
that is correlated with these competitor changes. To address this issue, I construct an 
equilibrium price response by the firm as a function of marginal costs. 
?̂?𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 = Λ𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙 Τ(𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚� )𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘,𝑛𝑛 + Λ𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘 Τ(𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚� )𝑘𝑘,𝑛𝑛 + Λ𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚� 𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛 (1.17) 
and: 
Λ𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 = �1 − Γ𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙 − Γ𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘 �
−1 
Λ𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙 = −�1 − Γ𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙 − Γ𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘 �
−1
Γ𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙  
Λ𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘 = −�1 − Γ𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙 − Γ𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘 �
−1
Γ𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘  
As shown in Appendix 1.C.1, Τ(𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚� )𝑘𝑘,𝑛𝑛 and Τ(𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚� )𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘,𝑛𝑛 denote marginal cost functions. 
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 As a secondary problem to the specification, notice that in practice we cannot 
observe a change in marginal cost. Instead, works such as Auer and Schoenle (2016) 
and Amiti, Itskhoki, and Konings (2014) focus on an equivalent observable measure, 
exchange rate movements. However, these exchange rate movements do not move one-
to-one with marginal costs. The prevailing explanation for this disconnect relates to the 
currency denomination of firm costs, which may not be in the exporting firm’s local 
currency.2 To address this disparity, let 𝜙𝜙𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛 denote the elasticity of marginal cost for 
firm 𝑖𝑖 with respect to its bilateral exchange rate. Next, I define the following relationship 
between marginal costs and exchange rates: 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚�𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛 = 𝜙𝜙𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛?̂?𝑒𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛 + 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛, where 
?̂?𝑒𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛 denotes the change in the bilateral exchange rate and 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛~𝑁𝑁(0,𝜎𝜎2). 
From this specification, I define the unconditional firm-specific pass-through rate 
as 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛. To find this expression, I substitute the above marginal cost expression 
into Equation 1.17 and take its derivative with respect to the exchange rate: 










+ Λ𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝜙𝜙𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀?̃?𝑖,𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛 (1.18) 
where Υ̇�𝜙𝜙𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒�~𝑚𝑚/𝜙𝜙𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒�𝑚𝑚�𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘,𝑛𝑛 denotes a function of the subsector competitor firms’ relative 
exchange rates, and Υ̇(𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚� )𝑘𝑘,𝑛𝑛 denotes a function of the sector competitor firms’ relative 
exchange rates. These functions follow a similar decomposition as Equation 1.17. 
 Building on Equation 1.18, the unconditional subsector pass-through rate equals: 










𝑚𝑚=1 , which denotes the 
weighted average of the firm-level pass-through within that subsector. Likewise, the 






𝑙𝑙=1 , where 
𝜔𝜔𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘,𝑛𝑛𝑙𝑙𝑘𝑘  denotes the subsector’s market share of sector 𝑘𝑘. Lastly, the aggregate pass-






𝑘𝑘=1 , where 𝜔𝜔𝑘𝑘,𝑛𝑛
𝑘𝑘𝑛𝑛  denotes the 
sector’s market share of country 𝑛𝑛. In the next section, I define the empirical framework 
and discuss the existing findings in the literature. 
 
2 Amiti et al. (2014) finds that large exporters tend to be large importers, with a pass-through rate 
of approximately 50%. In contrast, small non-importing firms have a nearly complete pass-through rate. 
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1.3 An Empirical Framework & Literature Findings 
This section presents an overview of the proposed empirical framework, as well as 
evidence in support of the theoretical model. The regressions presented in this section 
build on Auer and Schoenle (2016) and provide the necessary sequence of steps to 
examine the three propositions. To start, I identify an ideal data source and define the 
several parameters and variables for the setup of the model. Next, I specify the set of 
models to examine each proposition. Finally, I conclude this section by examining the 
current findings within the literature that provide evidence in support for my propositions. 
In the first subsection, I detail a disaggregated firm-level pricing data and bilateral 
exchange rate data. In the second subsection, I provide a framework to estimate the firm’s 
sector and subsector market shares. In the third subsection, I define the ROK and ROL 
price indices. In the fourth subsection, I present the empirical model specification. Finally, 
in the fifth subsection, I identify several works that provide evidence in support of several 
parts of my propositions. 
1.3.1 Data Specification 
To explore the propositions on the firm’s price-setting behavior, the empirical model 
requires import price data at the disaggregated product-level. Consider the unpublished 
monthly product-level import pricing data from the BLS International Price Program. This 
series primarily provides the BLS with indices to deflate the value of U.S. foreign trade. It 
contains transactions at the 10-digit level of the Harmonized Tariff Schedule (HTS), which 
is an extension of the Harmonized System (HS). That is, the 10-digit HTS code (HTS10) 
takes the same form as the 6-digit HS code (HS6), but it includes an additional 4-digit 
designation to further refine the classification of the product. 
The World Customs Organization maintains the HS tariff nomenclature, which 
contains 5,224 subheadings at the HS6 level. For example, in Section II, vegetable 
products, the code 1006.03 corresponds to: chapter 10, cereals; heading 06, rice; and 
subheading 30, semi-milled or wholly milled rice whether or not polished or glazed. The 
chapter corresponds to the HS2 level, the heading corresponds to the HS4 level, and the 
subheading corresponds to the HS6 level. 
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The U.S. International Trade Commission extends the HS coding system by 
subdividing the HS6 subheadings into 8-digit unique U.S. rate lines and 10-digit non-legal 
statistical reporting categories. The U.S. Customs and Border Protection is responsible 
for interpreting and enforcing the HTS, which provides a means to classify internationally 
traded goods and determine any applicable duty rates. This trade registry presents a 
wealth of statistical information and has gained favor within the international economics 
literature in recent years; however, it is unpublished and only available through special 
approval by the BLS. 
Based on this data, I would follow Gopinath and Rigobon (2008) and define a 
varietal good as a unique combination of a U.S. importer and HTS10 code. On average, 
they find 4 varietal goods within each code for a given year. Note that the price 
determining characteristic of the varietal good typically does not identify the foreign seller. 
Thus, in these instances the varietal prices capture when a U.S. importer switches from 
one foreign exporter to another. 
 The BLS collects this international pricing data on a monthly basis for 
approximately 20,000 goods. The collection process, as detailed by Gopinath and 
Rigobon (2008), entails the BLS contacting a reporting company and obtaining the actual 
price at or around the first of each month. In some instances, this information includes 
whether the price has been contracted, and if so for which periods. In these specific 
instances, the BLS will use the contracted prices. Finally, when possible, the BLS collects 
only the free on board (FOB) price of imported goods, which excludes insurance, freight, 
and trade duties. 
 The import pricing data requires several refinement steps before it is suitable for 
analysis. Consistent with Auer and Schoenle (2016) and Gopinath and Rigobon (2008), I 
would drop all flagged net price data or instances when the BLS estimates a price. 
Additionally, I would pull forward the last observed price in instances where it is missing 
for a single month, as done by Nakamura and Steinsson (2012). The last refinement step 
of this series relates to the balance of the data. Finally, I would follow the prevailing 




 In addition to the varietal price data, I identify a potential data source for the 
country-specific trade values. As detailed in the next subsection, I would need this trade 
data to estimate the firm’s market shares based on a structural relationship between firm’s 
varietal prices and its country’s market share. The U.S. Census Bureau provides this 
monthly country-specific trade values at the HS10 level, which corresponds to the HTS10 
coding. 
Finally, I identify a potential source for the exchange rate and control variable data. 
The bilateral nominal exchange rates are available from the International Monetary 
Fund’s (IMF’s) International Financial Statistics (IFS) online database. Following 
Gopinath, Itskhoki, and Rigobon (2010), I propose controlling for U.S. and foreign price 
levels using CPI data obtained from the IMF’s IFS online database. Additionally, I propose 
controlling for U.S. and foreign real GDP growth using data obtained from The World 
Bank National Accounts data and Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development National Accounts Data. 
1.3.2 Defining the Firm’s Market Shares 
This subsection presents the proposed methodology for estimating the firm’s sector and 
subsector market shares. Recall that the theoretical model requires these shares to 
identify the firm’s unique demand elasticity and price response. The approach follows 
Auer and Schoenle (2016), which find a statistically significant regression coefficient of 
1.02 between actual and predicted firm market shares. 
 The theoretical model implies a structural relationship between firm market share, 











  (1.19) 
where 𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡 denotes the import value of a subsector good produced in country 𝑚𝑚 and 
consumed in country 𝑛𝑛 at time 𝑡𝑡. The first fraction on the right-hand side of Equation 1.19 
provides country 𝑚𝑚’s subsector market share of imports by country 𝑛𝑛. The second fraction 
relates to the price relationship established in the theoretical section. 
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  (1.20) 
where 𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡 denotes the import value of a sector good produced in country 𝑚𝑚 and 
consumed in country 𝑛𝑛. The next subsection defines the import price indices. 
 In both cases, I must define what comprises a sector and a subsector. For 
instance, the firm’s sector market share could correspond to its share of the aggregate 
HS8 code. Likewise, the firm’s subsector market share could correspond to its share of 
the aggregate HS10 code. But, then again, I could define the firm’s sector market share 
as its share of the aggregate HS6 code. Perhaps I could even convert the data into the 
Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) 4-digit coding and define a sector based on its 2-
digit or 3-digit codes. In the final subsection of this section, I explore this open question 
in detail and discuss the existing approaches found in the literature. As it turns out, the 
variation across papers in the definition of a market ends up providing evidence in support 
for this paper. But first, let us define the import price indices and consider a general 
framework to examine the three propositions. 
1.3.3 Import Price Indices 
This subsection defines the ROL and ROK price indices faced by a firm. Recall that I need 
these indices to test the second and third test propositions from the theoretical section. 
First, consider the ROL price index, which represents the unique rest of subsector price 
faced by a firm: 










where Δ𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘,𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿  denotes the normalized log difference in the subsector price. 𝜔𝜔𝑗𝑗,𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘,𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡
𝑗𝑗𝑙𝑙  
denotes the firm’s subsector market share. Δ𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗,𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡 denotes the log difference of the 
competitor firm’s price. 
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Next, I define the ROK price index, which represents the rest of sector price faced 
by a firm: 












where Δ𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐾𝐾  denotes the normalized log difference in the sector price. Likewise, 
𝜔𝜔𝑗𝑗,𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡
𝑗𝑗𝑘𝑘  denotes the firm’s sector market share. With the price indices now specified, I 
move forward to the empirical model specification. 
1.3.4 Empirical Model Specification 
This subsection describes the empirical model specification to test the three propositions 
on the firm’s price-setting behavior. Consider an unbalanced fixed-effects model with the 
previously described disaggregated firm-level pricing data. This approach would capture 
both the observed and unobserved individual characteristics of each firm. Additionally, 
this model specification controls for the corresponding cross-sectional variation in each 
firm’s market shares. 
To begin, I would regress the firm’s price response on a change in the bilateral 
nominal exchange rate. Again, the use of exchange rates stems from the inability to 
observe individual firm marginal cost movements. This first regression verifies an 
incomplete pass-through rate by the firm: 
Δ𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + �𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖Δ𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡−𝑠𝑠
12
s=0
+ 𝜙𝜙𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 (1.23) 
where 𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 denotes the previously identified control variables of CPI inflation rates and real 
GDP growth rates. For parsimonious reasons, I shorten the notation in this section to only 
include the lowest level identifier for the firm and time period. For example, under this 
notation Δ𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 denotes the percentage change in firm 𝑖𝑖’s price, and Δ𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡 denotes the 
percentage change in the bilateral nominal exchange rate between the U.S. dollar and 
the currency of exporting firm. 
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The regression in Equation 1.23 includes a 12-month lag for the exchange rate. 
This lag reflects the stickiness of a firm’s prices and the time necessary to capture the full 
effect of the exchange rate movement. For example, a foreign exporter may have a 
contract in place with a U.S. importer, which prevents the import price from 
contemporaneously adjusting with exchange rate movement. Thus, the price adjustment 
would only impact future transactions and prices after the expiration of the contract. In the 
forthcoming regressions, I include a similar 12-month lag for all of the explanatory 
variables of interest. This general approach follows Berman, Martin, and Mayer (2012), 
and Amiti, Itskhoki, and Konings (2014). Furthermore, it provides the convenient way to 
directly compare findings with these works, where the sum of the coefficients, ∑ ?̂?𝛽12𝑠𝑠=0 , 
reflects the long-run firm-level ERPT. 
Next, I would introduce the firm’s subsector market share as an interaction term 
with the exchange rate: 






+ 𝜙𝜙𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 (1.24) 
where 𝜔𝜔𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙  denotes the firm’s subsector market share, and 𝜔𝜔𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙 𝛥𝛥𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡−𝑠𝑠 captures the 
interaction between the firm’s subsector market share and the bilateral exchange rate. By 
adding this term, I anticipate observing a decrease in the firm-level ERPT as the subsector 
market share increases. This result would conform with previous findings in the literature, 
including works like Berman, Martin, and Mayer (2012). 
Building on Equation 1.24, I introduce the squared subsector market share to 
capture the firm’s predicted non-linear price response: 









+ 𝜙𝜙𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 (1.25) 
Equation 1.25 provides the test for part one of the first proposition, where the quadratic 
term captures the u-shaped price response in subsector market share. In this regression, 
I anticipate observing an improvement in model fit relative to the linear version, as 
reflected by the 𝐸𝐸2 or Akaike Information Criterion. 
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+ 𝜙𝜙𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 
(1.26) 
Equation 1.26 includes the quadratic interaction term, which corresponds to the predicted 
u-shaped price response in sector market share. 
This regression contains two potential issues. First, the sector and subsector 
market shares may be linearly related. That is, a firm with a large subsector market share 
is more likely to have a large sector market share. To determine if multicollinearity is a 
problem, calculate the variance inflation factor (VIF). Second, the sector and subsector 
market shares interact with one another. That is, the firm’s price response for a given 
subsector market share changes with its sector market share. 
Building on the previous regression, I introduce the ROL price shock and the 
quadratic market shares: 















+ 𝜙𝜙𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝜑𝜑𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 
(1.27) 
where 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 contains the explanatory variables from Equation 1.26. Thus, Equation 1.27 
provides a complete test for the second proposition. Recall, part one of this proposition 
predicts a hump-shaped price response in subsector market share to a ROL price shock 
(∑ 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖,𝑠𝑠𝜔𝜔𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙 𝛥𝛥𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−𝑠𝑠𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿12s=0 + ∑ 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖,𝑠𝑠(𝜔𝜔𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙 )2𝛥𝛥𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−𝑠𝑠12s=0 ). Additionally, part two predicts a u-shaped 
price response in sector market share to a ROL price shock (∑ 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖,𝑠𝑠𝜔𝜔𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘𝛥𝛥𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−𝑠𝑠𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿12s=0 +
∑ 𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖,𝑠𝑠(𝜔𝜔𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘)2𝛥𝛥𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−𝑠𝑠𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿12s=0 ). 
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Finally, I introduce a regression to test the third proposition by adding the quadratic 
















+ 𝜙𝜙𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝜑𝜑𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 
(1.28) 
where 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 now contains the explanatory exchange rate and subsector price variables from 
Equation 1.27. Thus, Equation 1.28 represents a complete test of the third proposition. 
Recall, part one of this proposition predicts a constantly increasing response in subsector 
market share to a ROK price shock (∑ 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖,𝑠𝑠𝜔𝜔𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙 𝛥𝛥𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−𝑠𝑠𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐾𝐾12s=0 + ∑ 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖,𝑠𝑠(𝜔𝜔𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙 )2𝛥𝛥𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−𝑠𝑠𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐾𝐾12s=0 ). 
Additionally, part two predicts a hump-shaped response in sector market share to a ROK 
price shock (∑ 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖,𝑠𝑠𝜔𝜔𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘𝛥𝛥𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−𝑠𝑠𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐾𝐾12s=0 + ∑ 𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖,𝑠𝑠(𝜔𝜔𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘)2𝛥𝛥𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−𝑠𝑠𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐾𝐾12s=0 ). With the empirical models 
defined, this paper examines the findings within the existing literature. 
1.3.5 Existing Market Structure and ERPT Findings 
To date, a number of works have provided evidence on the importance of market structure 
in determining the firm’s price-setting behavior. This subsection examines some of these 
findings in the context of the four-tiered nested-CES model presented in this paper. While 
these other works do not address all of the propositions in this work, they nonetheless 
provide an overwhelming level of support for several of them. Additionally, these findings 
suggest that firms compete on fields of competition well beyond the two dimensions of 
sector and subsector market shares considered here. This chapter therefore provides a 
new approach to model the firm’s price-setting behavior. 
To begin, consider the work of Auer and Schoenle (2016), which relies on the 
previously identified disaggregated BLS import pricing data. In that paper, they present a 
three-tiered nested-CES model—a variation of the one presented here. In their setup, the 
firm has a non-negligible sector market share, where the unique combination of a U.S. 
importer and HTS10 code represents the product level. Moreover, they define the sector 
as an aggregation of a given HTS10 code. 
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To understand the implication of their sector market delineation, consider the 
following example. The HTS10 code of 2208.30.30.30 corresponds to Irish whiskeys and 
Scottish whiskies in a container of 4 liters or less. Under Auer and Schoenle’s designation, 
Irish and Scottish distillers would be in competition with other distillers from that region 
only. However, it seems probable that a potential consumer may also consider 
alternatives, such as American whiskeys and Japanese whiskies. 
Inherently, there is nothing wrong with the market designation provided by Auer 
and Schoenle. Irish whiskeys and Scottish whiskies comprise a specific market, in which 
bottles of similar quality compete against one another. Yet, this market is incomplete 
because it does not capture the full field of competition. The solution is not to redefine the 
market into a single, all-encompassing one. Recall that doing so under a CES demand 
function restricts the degree of substitutability between all bottles, requiring them to be 
the same. Yet, on average, the degree of substitutability between Irish whiskeys and 
Scottish whiskies is likely larger than their degree of sustainability with other whiskies of 
the world. 
A better solution to the problem would be to introduce an additional tier into the 
nested-CES demand function. This new tier allows for an expansion of the field of 
competition, while maintaining some variation in the degree of substitutability between 
bottles. When setting prices, Irish and Scottish distillers would still consider their market 
share relative to the region’s production. However, they would also consider their market 
share relative to the rest of the world’s production. Under this demand structure, these 
considerations must be factored separately due to the differences in the degree of 
substitutability. 
This added dimension of complexity to the CES demand function resolves, in part, 
the critique by Matsuyama and Ushchev (2017). It is still true that households cannot have 
preferences in which some goods are essential, and other goods are inessential; 
however, as described by Anderson and Moroney (1994), the degree of substitutability or 
essentialness can now vary. 
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With an understanding of the implications of the market designation by Auer and 
Schoenle, I now examine their findings in the context of the four-tier nested-CES model. 
To begin, they find a u-shaped price response in market share to an exchange rate 
movement at the HTS10 level. For the purposes of this paper, I label an aggregated 
HTS10 code as the subsector, where Equation 1.19 details how to estimate the firm’s 
subsector market share. Thus, a firm that has a small subsector market share will pass 
through most of an exchange rate shock because it has no subsector market share to 
lose. A firm that has a monopoly at the subsector level will also pass through most of an 
exchange rate shock because it has no competitors nor risk of losing any subsector 
market share. However, a firm with a medium-sized market share will not pass through 
the entire exchange rate shock in fear that it will lose market share. This finding supports 
part one of the first proposition presented in this paper. 
The second finding of Auer and Schoenle is a hump-shaped price response in 
market share to a composite competitor price shock at the HTS10 level. That is, they find 
that a firm with a small market share will not respond to the composite competitor’s price 
shock. Again, this firm has no market power and thus no ability to set the market price. 
Likewise, a firm that has a monopoly at this subsector level also does not respond to a 
change in the composite competitor’s price because it is already charging the profit 
maximizing price and the shock has a negligible effect on the market. However, a firm 
with a medium-size subsector market share would react to a composite competitor’s price 
shock by adjusting its price upward, while still maintaining its market share. This finding 
supports part one of the second proposition presented in this paper. 
In a working paper version of their 2016 paper, Auer and Schoenle conduct a 
robustness exercise and define the sector as an aggregation of a given HTS6 code. For 
the purposes of this paper, I label an aggregated HTS6 code as the sector, where 
Equation 1.20 details how to estimate the firm’s sector market share. Using this definition, 
they again find a u-shaped price response in market share to an exchange rate 
movement. The logic behind this u-shaped response mirrors that of the above subsector 
response, but as it relates to the sector. Thus, this finding supports part two of the first 
proposition presented in this paper. 
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The second finding of Auer and Schoenle’s robustness check is a hump-shaped 
price response in market share to a composite competitor price shock at the HTS6 level. 
As with the prior case, the logic behind this hump-shaped response mirrors that of the 
above subsector response, but as it relates to the sector. Thus, this finding supports part 
one of the third proposition presented in this paper. Notably, the three-tiered nested-CES 
model in Auer and Schoenle (2016) can independently explain the price-setting 
phenomenon at both the HTS6 and HTS10 levels; and yet, it cannot explain both at the 
same time. The four-tiered model presented in this paper fully explains this price-setting 
and provides potential new insight into the firm’s behavior. 
 Auer and Schoenle’s overall findings provide evidence in support for this paper’s 
first proposition, as well as part one of both the second and third propositions. This 
evidence leaves unsubstantiated part two of both the second and third propositions. In 
the context of their paper, part two of the second proposition corresponds to how different 
firms react across sector market share to a composite competitor price shock at the 
HTS10 level. This paper predicts a u-shaped price response in sector market share for 
the middle three quintiles, while the lower and upper quintiles are much less pronounced. 
Additionally, part two of the third proposition relates to how firms react across subsector 
market share to a composite competitor price shock at the HTS6 level. This model 
predicts an increasing price response in market share for the middle three quintiles, while 
the lower and upper quintiles are less pronounced. 
Related ERPT works, such as Feenstra, Gagnon, and Knetter (1996) and 
Malenbaum (2015) have relied on varying definitions of the firm and market. Nonetheless, 
these works provide similar supporting results. The nested-CES model presented in this 
paper may provide insight into some of the unexplained variation in their findings and 
improve the fit of their model estimates. For instance, Malenbaum (2015) relies on median 
and average firm responses for each market share percentile due to significant noise in 
the data. The additional dimensions of competition captured under a four-tiered nested-
CES model may explain some of this variation. In total, these works identify the 
importance of market structure and competition in the firm’s price-setting decision. This 




In conclusion, this chapter extends the imperfect competition model of Atkeson and 
Burstein (2008) by adding an additional field of competition. The four-tier nested-CES 
demand function presented in this paper incorporates the firm’s non-negligible sector and 
subsector market shares to explain the firm’s price-setting behavior. It enables the firm to 
compete against other firms within its subsector, as well as against firms within other 
sectors. Although this paper primarily focuses on the firm’s price-setting behavior through 
the lens of ERPT, the general theory holds in a much broader context. Thus, this paper 
contributes to the literature by providing a new framework to capture the relationship 
between goods in different markets. 
 This chapter provides three key insights into the firm’s price-setting behavior. First, 
the u-shaped price response in both sector and subsector market shares to an exchange 
rate movement. Second, the hump-shaped price response in subsector market share and 
the u-shaped price response in sector market share to a change in its subsector price. 
Third, an increasing price response in subsector market share and a hump-shaped 
response in sector market share to a change in its sector price. These three insights 
improve our general understanding of the nature of the firm’s price-setting behavior. 
 As evidence in support for this model, I examine in detail the findings of Auer and 
Schoenle (2016). The results within their final work, as well as their earlier working paper 
confirm the first proposition of this paper. Additionally, their results provide support for 
part one of both the second and third propositions of this paper. Other ERPT works, such 
as Feenstra, Gagnon, and Knetter (1996), find similar evidence in support for this four-
tier nested-CES model under alternative definitions of a firm and market. 
 The findings in this chapter present a future opportunity to test the remaining 
unsubstantiated parts of the second and third proposition. They also provide an 
opportunity to re-examine the existing literature’s findings through this lens multi-
dimensional fields of competition. This nested-CES demand framework may potentially 
improve the predictive power and fit of these prior works, as well as provide new insight 



































































































Appendix 1.A.1: Optimal Consumption Derivation 
This appendix presents the optimal consumption derivation for the representative 
household. To begin, consider a representative household from country 𝑛𝑛, which seeks 









where 𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛 denotes the aggregate composite consumption index good for country 𝑛𝑛, and 
𝑁𝑁𝑛𝑛 denotes labor supply in hours. In this setup, the representative household’s 
preferences follow an isoelastic utility function, where 𝜎𝜎 ≥ 0, 𝜎𝜎 ≠ 1, 𝜑𝜑 ≥ 0, and 𝜑𝜑 ≠ −1. 
Next, I define the aggregate composite consumption index, which takes the form 
of a nested-CES demand function: 











where 𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛 denotes the composite consumption good produced by country 𝑚𝑚 and 
consumed by country 𝑛𝑛. 𝜂𝜂 denotes the elasticity of substitution between the domestic and 
foreign composite consumption goods. 𝛼𝛼𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛 denotes an exogenous preference weight for 
goods produced in country 𝑚𝑚 and consumed by country 𝑛𝑛. 
The composite consumption index good for goods produced in country 𝑚𝑚 and 
consumed in country 𝑛𝑛 equals: 









where 𝐶𝐶𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛 denotes the sector composite good of sector 𝑘𝑘 from country 𝑚𝑚, and 𝜃𝜃 denotes 




The third tier within this nested demand structure consists of 𝑙𝑙 ∈ 𝐿𝐿𝑘𝑘 subsector 
goods: 









where 𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛 denotes the subsector composite good of sector 𝑙𝑙, and 𝛿𝛿 denotes the 
elasticity of substitution between subsector goods. 
The fourth tier within this nested demand structure consists of 𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝐽𝐽𝑙𝑙 differentiated 
varietal goods, produced by monopolistically competitive firms: 









where 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛 denotes the varietal good 𝑖𝑖 from country 𝑚𝑚, and 𝛾𝛾 denotes the elasticity of 
substitution between varietal goods. 











≤ 𝑊𝑊𝑛𝑛𝑁𝑁𝑛𝑛 + 𝑇𝑇𝑛𝑛 
where 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛 denotes the price of varietal good 𝑖𝑖, 𝑊𝑊𝑛𝑛 denotes the nominal wage for a 
worker in country 𝑛𝑛, and 𝑇𝑇𝑛𝑛 denotes lump-sum transfers and taxes. 
Using the current value approach, the Lagrangian for the representative 
household’s problem is: 














The first-order conditions with respect to the choice variables of the representative 
household’s problem equal: 
𝜕𝜕ℒ
𝜕𝜕𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛




= 0 ⇔ 𝑁𝑁𝑛𝑛 = �𝜆𝜆𝑊𝑊𝑛𝑛,�
1/𝜑𝜑 
where the necessary condition for a relative extremum requires that each of these 
conditions equal zero. 
To find the representative household’s optimal consumption, divide the Frisch 
demand for varietal good 𝑖𝑖 by a competing differentiated varietal good 𝑗𝑗, where 𝑗𝑗 ∈ 𝐽𝐽𝑙𝑙. That 




−𝛾𝛾. Next, multiply both sides by varietal good 






𝑗𝑗=1 . Finally, use the fact that the 
summation of expenditures across varietal goods for a given subsector equals the total 
expenditure for that subsector:∑ 𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗,𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗,𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛
𝐽𝐽𝑙𝑙
𝑗𝑗=1 = 𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑃𝑃𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛. 
Using the total subsector expenditure condition, the optimal consumption of a 
varietal good equals: 






where 𝑃𝑃𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛 denotes the index price of subsector 𝑙𝑙. The ability to third-degree price 
discriminate implies that the optimal consumption can vary across countries. 
The elasticity equals the rate of change in relative demand over the rate of change 
in marginal substitution (MRS) or: 𝑑𝑑 log�𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛/𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗,𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛� /𝑑𝑑 log�𝑀𝑀𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗�. From the optimal 
consumption condition, the relative demand equals: �𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛/𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗,𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛�
−𝛾𝛾. Though a bit of 
algebra, the MRS equals: 𝑀𝑀𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 = 𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗,𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛/𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛. Thus, the elasticity of substitution for 
varietal goods equals 𝛾𝛾. 
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To find the optimal consumption condition for a subsector good, repeat the steps 
from the varietal good optimization process at the subsector level to find: 






where 𝑃𝑃𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛 denotes the index price of sector 𝑘𝑘. 
To find the optimal consumption condition for a sector good, again repeat the steps 
from the varietal goods optimization process at the sector level to find: 






where 𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛 denotes the index price for a composite consumption good produced in country 
𝑚𝑚 and consumed by country 𝑛𝑛. 
At the top level of this nested-CES demand structure, the optimal composite 
consumption of goods exported from country 𝑚𝑚 equals: 






where 𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛 ≡ [∑ 𝛼𝛼𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛(𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛)1−𝜂𝜂𝑁𝑁𝑚𝑚=1 ]
1
1−𝜂𝜂 and denotes the CPI for country 𝑛𝑛. These equations 
define the representative household’s optimal consumption conditions. 
Before concluding this appendix, consider the implications of this nested-CES 
demand structure under a symmetric equilibrium scenario. Using the first order log-
difference, while holding prices fixed, I find: ?̂?𝑚𝑛𝑛 = 𝜂𝜂/�(𝜂𝜂 − 1)𝑛𝑛�� + ?̂?𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛, where 𝑥𝑥� ≡ 𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥/𝑥𝑥 and 
𝑥𝑥 ≠ 0, and ?̂?𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛 denotes the percent change of the composite consumption good produced 
in country 𝑚𝑚 and consumed in country 𝑛𝑛. This expression, 𝜂𝜂/�(𝜂𝜂 − 1)𝑛𝑛��, represents the 
extensive margin, which more than offsets the intensive margin of ?̂?𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛. Notice that when 
𝜂𝜂 > 1, an increase in the number of countries results in an increase in the amount of the 
composite country good. Additionally, recall that 𝜕𝜕𝑈𝑈/𝜕𝜕𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛 > 0. Thus, an increase in the 
number of available composite consumption goods leads to an increase in utility. This 
proof extends to the other goods, without loss of generality. 
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Appendix 1.B.1: The Firm’s Optimal Markup Derivation 
This appendix presents the optimal markup derivation for the firm. Under Bertrand 
competition, the firm sets its price to maximize profit for each of its 𝑛𝑛 ∈ 𝑁𝑁 markets: 
𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛 = max𝑃𝑃i,l,k,mn
��𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛 −𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛�𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛� 

























where 𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛 denotes the constant marginal cost for firm 𝑖𝑖. 
Using the real goods market clearing condition, the firm’s maximization problem 









where each firm has non-negligible size at the sector and subsector levels. At the country 
composite good level, firms compete in a competitive market. 







�𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛 + �𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛 −𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛�(−𝛾𝛾 + (𝛾𝛾 − 𝛿𝛿)𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙 + (𝛿𝛿 − 𝜃𝜃)𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘)� = 0 
where 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙 ≡ �𝜕𝜕𝑃𝑃𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛 𝜕𝜕𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛⁄ ��𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛 𝑃𝑃𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛⁄ � and denotes the partial price elasticity of 
the subsector price. Similarly, 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘 ≡ �𝜕𝜕𝑃𝑃𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛 𝜕𝜕𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛⁄ ��𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛 𝑃𝑃𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛⁄ � and denotes the 
partial price elasticity of the sector price for goods. The term partial implies that the 
expression does not capture the price adjustment by competing firms through the sector 




Using the subsector price index defined in the main text, the partial derivative of 












To find the partial elasticity from the first-order condition, multiply this equation by the 















where this varietal partial price elasticity relates to a given subsector good. 
Next, substitute the optimal consumption condition from the household’s problem 



























where this summation derives from the first-order condition of the firm’s problem. Notice 
that this summation does not affect the numerator of this equation because the 
expression pertains to an individual firm from a specific country. 
Using the previous equation, take the summation across all varietals in that 
subsector, and across all 𝑚𝑚 ∈ 𝑁𝑁 countries. Substitute the optimal consumption condition 




















where the firm’s subsector market share of country 𝑛𝑛 equals a function its of relative 

















This equivalence allows me to substitute in the firm’s sector market share of country 𝑛𝑛 
into the first-order condition of the firm’s problem. In a sense, the firm internalizes this 
market share in its first-order condition; however, this elasticity remains incomplete as it 
does not yet account for the strategic behavior by competing firms. 


























To find a partial elasticity from the first-order condition, I multiply this derivative by the 


















Notice that this equation contains two parts: the varietal price relative to the subsector 
price, and the subsector price relative to the sector price. 
Next, I substitute the optimal consumption condition for the varietal and sector 
















































where again, this summation arises from the first-order condition of the firm’s problem. 
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Complementary to the subsector market share condition, I define the firm’s sector 
















where 𝜔𝜔𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘 ≡ 𝜔𝜔𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙 𝜔𝜔𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑙𝑙𝑘𝑘  and denotes a firm’s market share of sector 𝑘𝑘, and 
𝜔𝜔𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑙𝑙𝑘𝑘  denotes the subsector’s market share of sector 𝑘𝑘. 
Next, I substitute the optimal consumption conditions for the varietal and subsector 









































This equation establishes a direct relationship between the partial price elasticity with 
















�𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛 + �𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛 −𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛��−𝛾𝛾 + (𝛾𝛾 − 𝛿𝛿)𝜔𝜔𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙 + (𝛿𝛿 − 𝜃𝜃)𝜔𝜔𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘 �� = 0 
then I solve for the price: 
𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛 =
𝛾𝛾 − (𝛾𝛾 − 𝛿𝛿)𝜔𝜔𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙 − (𝛿𝛿 − 𝜃𝜃)𝜔𝜔𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘
𝛾𝛾 − (𝛾𝛾 − 𝛿𝛿)𝜔𝜔𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙 − (𝛿𝛿 − 𝜃𝜃)𝜔𝜔𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘 − 1
𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛 
where this equation expresses the firm’s price as a function of market shares. Using this 
equation, I define the firm’s unique partial demand elasticity: 
𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛 = 𝛾𝛾�1 − 𝜔𝜔𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙 � + 𝛿𝛿�𝜔𝜔𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙 − 𝜔𝜔𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘 � + 𝜃𝜃𝜔𝜔𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘  
which depends on the firm’s sector and subsector market shares. 
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Appendix 1.C.1: The Firm’s Price as a Function of Marginal Cost 
This appendix presents the firm’s equilibrium price response as a function of marginal 
costs. A country’s CPI inflation rate ultimately depends on its aggregation across changes 
in firm-level marginal costs. This aggregation implies that each firm’s equilibrium price 
response can also be represented as a function of only marginal costs. Given that the 
sector and subsector prices represent weighted summations across individual firms, this 
appendix substitutes the firm’s price response into both price definitions. That is, I provide 
an expression for the sector price response and the subsector price response as functions 
of marginal costs. In turn, these expressions pin down the firm’s equilibrium price 
response as a function of marginal costs. 
To begin, I rewrite Equation 1.13 from the main text as a function of marginal cost, 
sector price, and subsector price: 
?̂?𝑝𝑗𝑗,𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛 = Λ𝑗𝑗,𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛
𝑗𝑗𝑙𝑙 ?̂?𝑝𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘,𝑛𝑛 + Λ𝑗𝑗,𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛
𝑗𝑗𝑘𝑘 ?̂?𝑝𝑘𝑘,𝑛𝑛 + Λ𝑗𝑗,𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚�𝑗𝑗,𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛 
where: 
Λ𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 = �1 − Γ𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙 − Γ𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘 �
−1 
Λ𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙 = −�1 − Γ𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙 − Γ𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘 �
−1
Γ𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙  
Λ𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘 = −�1 − Γ𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙 − Γ𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘 �
−1
Γ𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘  
Note that the main text defines Γ𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙  and Γ𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘 . 
Next, I substitute this equation into the following definition of the subsector price: 





𝑚𝑚=1 , where 𝜔𝜔𝑗𝑗,𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛
𝑗𝑗𝑙𝑙  denotes the firm’s subsector market 
share and weight of each firm’s effect on the subsector price for country 𝑛𝑛: 
?̂?𝑝𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘,𝑛𝑛 ≡� � 𝜔𝜔𝑗𝑗,𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛
𝑗𝑗𝑙𝑙 �Λ𝑗𝑗,𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛
𝑗𝑗𝑙𝑙 ?̂?𝑝𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘,𝑛𝑛 + Λ𝑗𝑗,𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛






where the subsector price is a function of marginal cost, sector price, and subsector price. 
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Using the above expression, I solve for the subsector price as a function of 
















However, to determine the firm’s equilibrium price response, the subsector price must be 
expressed as a function of only the marginal cost. 
 To do so, I must first establish the sector price as a function of only marginal cost. 
I begin by substituting the above subsector price into the sector price and solving for 
sector price as a function of marginal cost. Next, I substitute the sector price expression 
back into the above subsector price, which then expresses the subsector price as a 
function of only marginal cost. At that point, I substitute both the sector and subsector 
price responses back into the firm’s price response. 
 Next, I define the sector price as an expression of ∀𝑗𝑗 ∈ 𝐽𝐽𝑙𝑙 firms: ?̂?𝑝𝑘𝑘,𝑛𝑛 ≡







𝑚𝑚=1 , and substitute it into the firm’s best response to find: 
?̂?𝑝𝑘𝑘,𝑛𝑛 = ���𝜔𝜔𝑗𝑗,𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛
𝑗𝑗𝑘𝑘 �Λ𝑗𝑗,𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛
𝑗𝑗𝑙𝑙 ?̂?𝑝𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘,𝑛𝑛 + Λ𝑗𝑗,𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡








where the sector price equals a function of marginal cost, sector price, and subsector 
price. 
Using this equation, substitute in the above subsector price and solve for the sector 
price to find: 
Τ(𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚� )𝑘𝑘,𝑛𝑛 =
∑ ∑ ∑ 𝜔𝜔𝑗𝑗,𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛
𝑗𝑗𝑘𝑘 �Λ𝑗𝑗,𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛



















1 − ∑ ∑ ∑ 𝜔𝜔𝑗𝑗,𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛
𝑗𝑗𝑘𝑘 �Λ𝑗𝑗,𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛



















where Τ(𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚� )𝑘𝑘,𝑛𝑛 denotes the sector price response as a function of only marginal cost. 
Note that the marginal costs consist of all firms competing within country 𝑛𝑛. 
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Next, I pin down the subsector price by substituting in the sector price to find: 
Τ(𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚� )𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚 ≡ ?̂?𝑝𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘,𝑛𝑛 ≡
∑ ∑ ∑ 𝜔𝜔𝑗𝑗,𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛
𝑗𝑗𝑘𝑘 �Λ𝑗𝑗,𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛
















where Τ(𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚� )𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚 denotes the subsector price response as a function of marginal cost. 
Notice that the marginal cost component also consists of all firms competing within 
country 𝑛𝑛. 
 Finally, I substitute equations the sector and subsector prices into the firm’s price 
response to find: 
?̂?𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 = Λ𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙 Τ(𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚� )𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘,𝑛𝑛 + Λ𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘,𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘 Τ(𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚� )𝑘𝑘,𝑛𝑛 + Λ𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚� 𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛 
where Τ(𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚� )𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙,𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛 denotes the firm price response as a function of only marginal cost. 
This equation represents how a firm will adjust its price in response to a marginal cost 
shock, which includes its own cost shock, or a competitor’s cost shock within the firm’s 
















Market Structure and Exchange Rate Pass-Through: 
A DSGE Model 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The United States represents the largest single importer of goods and services in the 
world. Throughout the Post-World War II trade era, economists have observed a 
disconnect between U.S. exchange rates and import prices. This chapter seeks to explain 
that puzzle. In this paper, I present a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) 
model with strategic price complementarities, and then I calibrate it to U.S. import prices. 
The nested-CES demand function that underpins my DSGE model follows from 
the previous chapter, in which firms have non-negligible sector market shares. Recall, a 
non-negligible market share corresponds to a firm’s downward sloping demand curve. 
This model feature leads to strategic price-setting behavior by firms. As detailed in Ball 
and Romer (1990), the presence of strategic price complementarities helps explain the 
empirically observed price rigidities to nominal shocks. That is, it explains the exporting 
firm’s incomplete price adjustment in response to an exchange rate movement. At the 
aggregate level, my model poses two predictions. First, a U.S. trade partner decreases 
its import price in response to a real exchange rate movement. Second, a U.S. trade 
partner increases its import price in response to a competitor’s price increase. 
Recall that ERPT measures the responsiveness of international prices to an 
exchange rate movement. Specifically, it is the elasticity of the home country’s import 
price with respect to the home country’s relative price of the foreign currency. As the home 
currency appreciates against the foreign currency, the home country should be able to 
purchase a proportional amount more in foreign goods. For example, a 10 percent 
appreciation of the U.S. dollar against the Japanese yen should lead to a 10 percent 
decrease in the price of imported goods from Japan. Put simply, given that the U.S. dollar 
buys 10 percent more Japanese yen than before, we expect that the buying power of U.S. 




However, works as early as Kreinin (1977) found evidence of incomplete pass-
through and reasoned that the root cause stems from incomplete price adjustments by 
firms. Over the years, the international economics literature has developed a number of 
imperfect competition models to explain the firm’s incomplete price response and the 
incomplete ERPT at the aggregate level. Of particular interest to this paper, Atkeson and 
Burstein (2008) extend the international monopolistic competition model of Krugman and 
Helpman (1985). Their nested-CES demand model assumes that each firm has a non-
negligible market share and faces a downward-sloping demand curve. Other works, such 
as Yang (1997), Ravn (2001), and Bodnar, Dumas, and Marston (2002), have relied on 
similar demand systems to explain incomplete ERPT. 
As established in chapter one, the definitions of a firm and a market vary across 
the literature; however, many of the key insights hold regardless of these variations. For 
example, Feenstra, Gagnon, and Knetter (1996) take the broadest view of a firm and 
examine the world automobile market through the lens of non-negligible country market 
share. Nonetheless, they surmise that an exporting country’s pass-through elasticity is u-
shaped in automotive market share. 
The multi-country DSGE framework with a three-tiered nested-CES demand 
function builds on chapter one. In aggregate, this model explains the U.S. trade partner’s 
incomplete price response to an exchange rate movement. On average, firms with a non-
negligible market share will absorb some of the exchange rate shock to avoid losing 
market share to a competitor. Likewise, this model explains the U.S. trade partner’s price 
response to a competitor’s price change. On average, firms with a non-negligible market 
share will increase their price without losing market share when a competitor increases 
its price. 
In section two, I present the DSGE model. I place much of the model’s derivations 
in the appendices for brevity while including key steps in the main text. Section three 
estimates a Bayesian vector autoregression (BVAR) model for U.S. import prices by trade 
partner. Section four presents the calibrated DSGE model. Finally, section five provides 
concluding remarks. Note that I place all tables and figures at the end of the paper, before 




2.2 Theoretical Model 
This section presents the multi-country DSGE model, which relies on a three-tiered 
nested-CES demand function. Recall that in chapter one I introduced a more complex 
four-tier system. In this chapter, I explain aggregate U.S. trade partner behavior. For that 
reason, I simplify the demand function, while placing the entire setup into a general 
equilibrium framework. 
 This section begins with the representative household’s problem, then it presents 
several necessary trade identities. From there, I move to the supply side and establish 
the firm’s production technology and price-setting behavior. Finally, I conclude the section 
with the general equilibrium and a basic monetary rule. 
2.2.1 Household’s Problem 
To begin, consider a representative household from country 𝑛𝑛, which seeks to maximize 





where 𝛽𝛽𝑡𝑡 denotes the discount factor at period 𝑡𝑡, 𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡 denotes the aggregate composite 
consumption index good for country 𝑛𝑛, and 𝑁𝑁𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡 denotes labor supply in hours. 
Preferences follow isoelastic utility function: 𝑢𝑢𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡 ≡ 1/(1 − 𝜎𝜎)𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡1−𝜎𝜎 − 1/(1 + 𝜑𝜑)𝑁𝑁𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡
1+𝜑𝜑, 
where 𝜎𝜎 ≥ 0, 𝜎𝜎 ≠ 1, 𝜑𝜑 ≥ 0, and 𝜑𝜑 ≠ 1. Thus, a household chooses the combination of 
consumption and leisure to maximize its expected utility. 
In consumption, this utility function is strictly increasing (𝑢𝑢𝑚𝑚 > 0), strictly concave 
(𝑢𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 < 0), and exhibits prudence (𝑢𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 > 0). As defined in Kimball (1990), a positive third 
derivative of consumption implies precautionary saving, or more generally, precautionary 
behavior. Prudence means that an increase in background risk leads to an increase in 
the expected marginal utility of saving. In labor supply, the disutility associated with 
working counters the properties of consumption (i.e., 𝑢𝑢𝑛𝑛 < 0, 𝑢𝑢𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 > 0 and 𝑢𝑢𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 < 0). Put 
another way, the properties of leisure parallel that of consumption, where 𝐿𝐿𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡 denotes 




The class of isoelastic utility functions possesses the unique property of constant 
relative risk aversion (CRRA). Under the Arrow-Pratt measure of relative risk aversion 
(one-input, one-period), 𝐸𝐸(𝑚𝑚) denotes the relative risk aversion and equals: 𝐸𝐸(𝑚𝑚) =
−𝑚𝑚𝑢𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚/𝑢𝑢𝑚𝑚. The household’s consumption-based coefficient of relative risk aversion for a 
simplified version of the above utility function would equal 𝜎𝜎. Under CRRA, the fraction of 
wealth used for consumption is independent of the level of initial wealth. However, in a 
dynamic equilibrium model, this approach over-estimates the household’s consumption-
based coefficient of relative risk aversion. 
Swanson (2012) points out that in a dynamic model, with consumption and leisure, 
the household’s labor margin has a substantial effect on risk aversion and asset prices. 
This risk measurement nuance arises from the fact that households are indifferent at the 
margin between absorbing an asset shock with changes to consumption or leisure. The 
previous Arrow-Pratt measure lacks the consumption–leisure linkage found in the typical 
budget constraint. Thus, it overstates the consumption-based risk measure and asset 
valuation of a utility function with multiple inputs and multiple periods. 
Using dynamic programming, Swanson (2012) demonstrates that the relative risk 
aversion at steady-state for a two-input, isoelastic utility function equals 𝐸𝐸(𝑚𝑚,𝑛𝑛) =
−𝐴𝐴𝑉𝑉𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚/𝑉𝑉𝑚𝑚. Under this measure, the household’s consumption-based coefficient of relative 
risk aversion equals: 𝐸𝐸(𝑚𝑚,𝑛𝑛) = (1/𝜎𝜎 + 1/𝜑𝜑)−1, for 𝜎𝜎 > 0 and 𝜑𝜑 > 0. This dynamic 
formulation reduces the previous estimate of consumption-based risk measurement. For 
example, when 𝜎𝜎 = 2 and 𝜑𝜑 = 1, the coefficient of relative risk aversion equals 2/3. Under 
the Arrow-Pratt measure, the coefficient of relative risk aversion equals 2. 
In terms of utility elasticities, 𝜀𝜀𝑢𝑢(𝑚𝑚) = 1/𝜎𝜎 denotes the elasticity of intertemporal 
substitution of consumption and represents the percentage change in consumption 
growth per percent increase in net interest rate. A small value for 𝜎𝜎 corresponds to a large 
value for the elasticity of intertemporal substitution of consumption, 𝜀𝜀𝑢𝑢(𝑚𝑚). This result 
means that consumption growth is sensitive to changes in the real interest rate. As for 
labor, 𝜀𝜀𝑢𝑢(𝑛𝑛) = 1/𝜑𝜑 denotes the elasticity of intertemporal substitution of labor supply and 




Notice that in the utility function the intertemporal substitution of labor supply 
equals the Frisch elasticity. The Frisch elasticity represents the elasticity of labor supply 
with respect to wage while keeping the marginal utility of wealth constant (better known 
as the substitution effect of labor supply). Thus, this relationship implies that the 
intertemporal substitution of labor supply has no wealth effect. 
Next, the aggregate composite consumption index takes the form of a nested-CES 
demand function—a variation on the Armington aggregator, which distinguishes goods 
by country of origin (Armington, 1969): 











where 𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡 denotes the composite consumption good produced by country 𝑚𝑚 and 
consumed by country 𝑛𝑛. 𝜂𝜂 denotes the elasticity of substitution between the domestic and 
foreign composite consumption goods. 𝛼𝛼𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛 denotes the household’s exogenous 
preference weight for goods produced in country 𝑚𝑚 and consumed by country 𝑛𝑛. This 
weight provides a mechanism for the representative household to shift its preference for 
goods between countries. 
Under this demand structure, households have homothetic preferences. That is, 
two households with different income levels demand goods in the same proportions. This 
property of homotheticity produces highly tractable computational solutions solved in 
polynomial time1 however, it also imposes a less realistic restriction. As Matsuyama and 
Ushchev (2017) detail, households cannot have preferences in which some goods are 
essential, and other goods are inessential.2  
 
1 An algorithm can be solved in polynomial time if the number of steps required to complete the 
algorithm for a given input equals 𝑇𝑇(𝑛𝑛) = 𝑂𝑂(𝑛𝑛𝑘𝑘), where 𝑛𝑛 denotes the complexity of the input, and 𝑘𝑘 denotes 
some positive constant. 
2 Consider two goods, 𝑚𝑚1 and 𝑚𝑚2, with prices 𝑝𝑝1 and 𝑝𝑝2, respectively. Let 𝑆𝑆21 denote a consumer’s 
expenditure on 𝑚𝑚2 relative to 𝑚𝑚1: 𝑆𝑆21 ≡ (𝑝𝑝2𝑚𝑚2)/(𝑝𝑝1𝑚𝑚1). A change in relative price, 𝑝𝑝2/𝑝𝑝1, leads to a change in 
relative consumption of: 𝑑𝑑𝑆𝑆21/𝑑𝑑(𝑝𝑝2/𝑝𝑝1) = (𝑚𝑚2/𝑚𝑚1)(1 − 𝜀𝜀21), where 𝜀𝜀21 denotes the elasticity of substitution 
between goods. If an increase in the relative price of 𝑚𝑚2 leads to a decrease in the relative expenditure on 
𝑚𝑚2, then the goods are gross complements (i.e., 𝜀𝜀21 < 1). If an increase in the relative price of 𝑚𝑚2 leads to 




 Before defining the country-level composite consumption good, I discuss the deep 
parameters from the composite consumption good. First, consider the role of 𝜂𝜂 in 
determining model performance within the broader international trade literature. Often 
referred to as the Armington elasticity, 𝜂𝜂 measures the substitutability between domestic 
and foreign goods. It represents one of the most critical parameters in modern trade 
theory (Hillberry and Hummels, 2013). 
Feenstra, Luck, Obstfeld, and Russ (2018) identify the Armington elasticity as a 
key deep parameter in international economics because it governs the relative demand 
response to relative international prices. Yet the literature contains little agreement, or at 
least consistency, as to the correct size specification of 𝜂𝜂. Perhaps more troubling, 
Schürenberg-Frosch (2015) re-simulates 50 published computable general equilibrium 
policy simulations and finds concerning results. Specifically, she finds significant variation 
in the resulting real gross domestic product (GDP), welfare, trade flows, prices, and 
production, depending on the size of the Armington elasticity. 
Next, consider the preference weight, 𝛼𝛼𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛, where ∑ 𝛼𝛼𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑁𝑁𝑚𝑚=1 = 1. This weight 
reflects the Armington exogenous country preference weight, which provides a 
mechanism for the representative household to shift its preference for goods across 
countries. For example, 𝛼𝛼𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛 = 1/𝑁𝑁 for ∀𝑚𝑚 ∈ 𝑁𝑁 denotes no bias in country preference, 
whereas 𝛼𝛼𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛 = 0 for ∀𝑚𝑚 ∈ 𝑁𝑁, 𝑚𝑚 ≠ 𝑛𝑛 and 𝛼𝛼𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 1 denotes perfect home bias. 
The issue of country preference bias, or more generally, home bias remains 
unresolved. As first documented in McCallum (1995), empirical evidence suggests strong 
home bias by households. Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000) identify this home bias in trade as 
one of the six major puzzles in international macroeconomics. Some potential 
explanations for home bias include: (1) the presence of informal and formal trade barriers; 
(2) non-negligible trade costs; (3) the lack of a common language; (4) patriotic duty; and 
(5) a negative correlation between product information and geographic distance. The 
above preference weight does not identify the source of this puzzle; however, in the 
coming steps I shift this classical conversation from one of home preference bias to that 
of individual product preference bias, where the product’s origin represents one 




For now, let us return to the demand specification, where I define the composite 
consumption index good for goods produced in country 𝑚𝑚 and consumed in country 𝑛𝑛: 











where 𝐶𝐶𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡 denotes the composite good of sector 𝑘𝑘 from country 𝑚𝑚, and 𝜃𝜃 denotes the 
elasticity of substitution between sectors. 𝛼𝛼𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛 denotes the household’s sector 
preference weight for goods of sector 𝑘𝑘 from country 𝑚𝑚 and consumed by country 𝑛𝑛. 
 The final level within this nested demand structure consists of 𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝐽𝐽𝑘𝑘 differentiated 
varietal goods, produced by monopolistically competitive firms: 











where 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡 denotes varietal good 𝑖𝑖 of sector 𝑘𝑘, and 𝛾𝛾 denotes the elasticity of 
substitution between varietals. 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖,𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛 denotes the household’s firm preference weight. 
As shown by the derivation in Appendix 2.A.1, the optimal consumption of a 
varietal good equals: 










1−𝛾𝛾 and denotes the price of a sector good 
produced in country 𝑚𝑚 and consumed by country 𝑛𝑛. 
From Equation 2.5, the optimal consumption condition for a sector good equals: 










1−𝜃𝜃 and denotes the price of a composite 




At the top of the three-tier nested-CES demand structure, the optimal composite 
consumption of goods exported from country 𝑚𝑚 equals: 










1−𝜂𝜂 and denotes CPI. 
 Next, I define the first order log-linearization of the marginal rate of substitution 
between consumption and leisure: 
𝜎𝜎𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡 + 𝜑𝜑𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡 = 𝑤𝑤𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡 − 𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡 (2.8) 
where workers take wage as given. As a general note, the lowercase notation denotes 
the log-linearization of the level variables, where 𝑥𝑥 ≡ log (𝑋𝑋), and 𝑋𝑋 ≠ 0. 
The final optimality condition of this subsection relates to the representative 
household’s intertemporal decision-making process for consumption. To find the 
stochastic Euler equation, I use the first-order conditions with respect to the composite 









�� = 1 (2.9) 
where lim
𝑇𝑇→∞
𝛽𝛽𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸0�𝜕𝜕𝑢𝑢/𝜕𝜕𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛,𝑇𝑇+1𝑄𝑄𝑛𝑛,𝑇𝑇,𝑇𝑇+1𝐷𝐷𝑛𝑛,𝑇𝑇+1� = 0 must hold to rule out the possibility of 
households over-accumulating wealth and under-consuming goods. 
 Next, I log-linearize Equation 2.9 and solve for consumption to find the 
representative household’s consumption decision: 
𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡 = 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡�𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡+1� −
1
𝜎𝜎
�𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡 − 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡�𝜋𝜋𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡+1� − ϒ� (2.10) 
where 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡�𝜋𝜋𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡+1� = 𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡+1 − 𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡 and denotes the expected CPI inflation rate for country 𝑛𝑛, 
and ϒ ≡ log (1/𝛽𝛽). Thus, the representative household’s forward-looking consumption 
decision depends on the expected future consumption. In the next subsection, this paper 




2.2.2 International Trade Identities 
This subsection presents the necessary international trade identities for the DSGE model. 
In this multi-country framework, the bilateral terms of trade (ToT) measures a country’s 
export composite price to its import composite price (i.e., 𝑆𝑆𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡 ≡ 𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡/𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡). Under this 
setup, firms can PTM, and export prices can vary across trade partners. 
Using the ToT identity, I redefine the CPI inflation rate for country 𝑛𝑛 as a function 
of prices faced by domestic households: 




where 𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡 denotes the log-linearized CPI for country 𝑛𝑛. 
From this expression, I substitute the associated 𝑚𝑚 ∈ 𝑁𝑁 − 1 log-linearized bilateral 
ToT to find: 
𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡 = 𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡 − (1− 𝛼𝛼𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛)𝑠𝑠𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡  (2.12) 
where 𝑠𝑠𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡 = (1 − 𝛼𝛼𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛)−1 ∑ 𝛼𝛼𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑠𝑠𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡𝑁𝑁−1𝑚𝑚=1,𝑚𝑚≠𝑛𝑛  and denotes the effective ToT for country 𝑛𝑛, 
and 𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡 denotes the log-linearized PPI for country 𝑛𝑛. 
To find the inflation rate for country 𝑛𝑛, I take the lagged difference of Equation 2.12: 
𝜋𝜋𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡 = 𝜋𝜋𝑛𝑛𝑤𝑤,𝑡𝑡 − (1− 𝛼𝛼𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛)Δ𝑠𝑠𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡 (2.13) 
where 𝜋𝜋𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡 denotes the actual CPI inflation rate and 𝜋𝜋𝑛𝑛𝑤𝑤,𝑡𝑡 denotes the PPI inflation rate. 
Additionally, Δ𝑠𝑠𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡 denotes the log-difference of the effective ToT for country 𝑛𝑛. 
Next, I define the bilateral nominal exchange rate in terms of the relative PPIs for 





where 𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡𝑛𝑛  denotes the PPI for country 𝑛𝑛 denominated in its local currency—as denoted 




Using Equation 2.14, I define the first order log-linearization of the bilateral nominal 
exchange rate: 
𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡 = 𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡𝑛𝑛 − 𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚  (2.15) 
where 𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡 = −𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡 and matches the standard PPI-based exchange rate definition. 
For the next step, I combine the first differences of the ToT and effective nominal 
exchange rate for country 𝑛𝑛: 
Δ𝑠𝑠𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡 = Δ𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡 − 𝜋𝜋𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡 + 𝜋𝜋𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡 (2.16) 
where Δ𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡 ≡ (1 − 𝛼𝛼𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛)−1 ∑ 𝛼𝛼𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛Δ𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡𝑁𝑁−1𝑚𝑚=1,𝑚𝑚≠𝑛𝑛  and denotes the effective nominal 
exchange rate. 𝜋𝜋𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡 ≡ (1 − 𝛼𝛼𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛)−1 ∑ 𝛼𝛼𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝜋𝜋𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡𝑁𝑁−1𝑚𝑚=1,𝑚𝑚≠𝑛𝑛  and denotes the actual rest of 
world (ROW) inflation rate. Finally, (1 − 𝛼𝛼𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛)−1 ∑ 𝛼𝛼𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛(1 − αmm)Δ𝑠𝑠𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡𝑁𝑁−1𝑚𝑚=1,𝑚𝑚≠𝑛𝑛 ≈ 0. 3 
Next, I define the bilateral RER as: Ɋnm,t = 𝜖𝜖𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚 /𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡𝑛𝑛 , where its first order log-
linearization equals: ɋ𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡 = 𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡 + 𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚 − 𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡𝑛𝑛 . Using this expression, I substitute in 
Equation 2.12 and the log-linearization of the bilateral nominal exchange rate to find: 
ɋ𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡 = (1 − 𝛼𝛼𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛)𝑠𝑠𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡 − (1 − 𝛼𝛼𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚)𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡 (2.17) 
where ɋ𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡 = −ɋ𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡. Similar to the previous effective measures in this subsection, the 
effective RER equals: ɋ𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡 ≡ (1 − 𝛼𝛼𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛)−1 ∑ 𝛼𝛼𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛ɋ𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡𝑁𝑁−1𝑚𝑚=1,𝑚𝑚≠𝑛𝑛 = (1 − 𝛼𝛼𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛)𝑠𝑠𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡. 
The next trade identity relates to risk sharing, where households have access to a 
complete international securities market. Under this specification, I combine the 





















where the currency of country 𝑛𝑛 serves as the numeraire. 
 
3 The ROW ToT equals approximately zero because for every increase in 𝑠𝑠𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡 there is an 




The log-linearization of Equation 2.18 combined with the definition of the bilateral 
RER and Equation 2.17 equals: 
𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡 = 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡 +
1
𝜎𝜎
�(1 − 𝛼𝛼𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛)𝑠𝑠𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡 − (1 − 𝛼𝛼𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚)𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡� (2.19) 
where the effective relative consumption equals: 𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡 = 𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡 +
1
𝜎𝜎
(1 − 𝛼𝛼𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛)𝑠𝑠𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡 and 𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡 
denotes the ROW consumption. 
The final trade identity characterizes the interest rate parity, which governs the 
relationship between interest rates and currency exchange rates across countries. The 
origins of the interest rate parity date back to Keynes (1923), although references to the 
concept of arbitrage date much earlier. Under the theory of interest rate parity, an 
investor’s hedged return on a security from its domestic country should equal that of the 
exchange rate adjusted return from another country. To demonstrate this point, consider 
the counterfactual in which parity on returns does not hold. In this situation, an arbitrage 
opportunity would exist for foreign exchange traders to buy or sell the out-of-balance 
currency, pushing the exchange rate adjusted return upward or downward. This process 
would continue until the adjusted return equals parity with all other securities. 
 The convergence of the securities market to a no-arbitrage equilibrium is 
straightforward in the above contemporaneous transaction setting; however, in this 
model, households realize the gains or losses of their one-period bonds in the next period. 
Feenstra and Taylor (2017) explain that this intertemporal delay implies that these 
households face exchange rate risk when holding foreign securities for one-period. That 
is, households do not know the future value of the nominal exchange rate. If the domestic 
currency unexpectantly appreciates relative to the foreign currency, households would 
realize a lower-than-expected exchange rate adjusted return. The trade literature deals 
with exchange rate risk in one of two ways. The first approach allows households to rely 
on forward contracts, with no uncertainty in the future nominal exchange rate. This 
method is known as the covered interest rate parity because the forward contract has 
covered any risk of an exchange rate fluctuation. As an alternative, the second approach 
in the literature allows households to rely on spot contracts. This method is known as the 




Under the UIP, the spot nominal exchange rate equals: 𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡 = 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡�𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡+1𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚/𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝑛𝑛�, 
and households cannot earn excess returns by simultaneously going long on a higher-
yielding bond and short on a lower-yielding bond. If this equality did not hold, traders 
would buy or sell the out-of-balance bond through a process known as uncovered interest 
arbitrage. These transactions would push the exchange rate adjusted return to 
equilibrium, where the adjusted return equals parity with all other securities. 
Using the UIP, I define a relationship between the effective ToT and the exchange 
rate adjusted return. I assume that households have access to a complete international 
securities market and the price of a riskless bond from country 𝑚𝑚 equals: 𝜖𝜖𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡/𝐸𝐸𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡 =
𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡�𝑄𝑄𝑡𝑡,𝑡𝑡+1𝜖𝜖𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡+1�. Likewise, the price of a riskless bond in country 𝑛𝑛 equals: 1/𝐸𝐸𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡 =
𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡�𝑄𝑄𝑡𝑡,𝑡𝑡+1�. By combining both bond prices, I find: 
𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡 − 𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡 = 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡�Δe𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡+1� (2.20) 
where the difference between the interest rates in countries 𝑛𝑛 and 𝑚𝑚 equals the expected 
percentage change in the bilateral nominal exchange rate. 
 Next, I define the UIP in terms of ToT and interest rates: 
𝑠𝑠𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡 = 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡�𝑠𝑠𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡+1� + (1− 𝛼𝛼𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛)−1�𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡 − 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡�𝜋𝜋𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡+1� − 𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡 + 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡�𝜋𝜋𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡+1� − (1− 𝛼𝛼𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚)𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡�Δ𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡+1�� (2.21) 
where 𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡 − 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡�𝜋𝜋𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡+1� equals the ex-ante real interest for country 𝑛𝑛. Through recursive 
substitution, I rewrite Equation 2.21 as a function of current and anticipated real interest 
rate differentials: 




where 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡+1 ≡ (1 − 𝛼𝛼𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛)−1 ∑ 𝛼𝛼𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡𝑁𝑁−1𝑚𝑚=1,𝑚𝑚≠𝑛𝑛  and denotes the ROW interest rate, and 
𝜋𝜋𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡+1 ≡ (1 − 𝛼𝛼𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛)−1 ∑ 𝛼𝛼𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝜋𝜋𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡𝑁𝑁−1𝑚𝑚=1,𝑚𝑚≠𝑛𝑛  and denotes the ex-ante ROW inflation rate. 
This concludes the international trade identity subsection. In the next subsection, I define 




2.2.3 Technology, Production, and Labor Demand 
In this setup, monopolistically competitive firms produce differentiated output goods, with 
a linear single country-wide technology: 
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖,𝑘𝑘,𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡 = 𝐴𝐴𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖,𝑘𝑘,𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡 (2.23) 
where 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖,𝑘𝑘,𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡 denotes the variety production good 𝑖𝑖 of sector 𝑘𝑘 from country 𝑛𝑛, and 𝐴𝐴𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡 
denotes the level of technology for firms in country 𝑛𝑛. I assume that the log-linearized 
technology, 𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡, follows the first-order autoregressive process of: 𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡 = 𝜌𝜌𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝑢𝑢𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎 . In 
this process, 𝜌𝜌 denotes the persistence of the first-order autocorrelation, and 𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎 denotes 
a white noise process, with mean zero and constant variance. 
 Using the marginal product of labor from the aggregate production function, the 
log-linearization of the equilibrium wage formula results in: 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡 = −𝜈𝜈𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡 + 𝑤𝑤𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡 − 𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡 − 𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡 (2.24) 
where 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡 ≡ log (𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡), 𝑤𝑤𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡 ≡ log (𝑊𝑊𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡), and 𝜈𝜈𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡 ≡ −log (1 − 𝜏𝜏𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡). The parameter 𝜏𝜏𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡 
denotes an aggregate employment subsidy in country 𝑛𝑛 at period 𝑡𝑡. In monopolistic 
competition models, firms under-produce and under-employ, which leads to a market 
inefficiency. To correct for this inefficiency in the labor market, I follow Rotemberg and 
Woodford (1999) and provide households with an employment subsidy of 𝜏𝜏𝑛𝑛. 







Without loss of generality, I extend Equation 2.23 to aggregate production in country 𝑛𝑛 






𝑛𝑛=1 . Combing 𝑍𝑍𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡 with aggregate labor demand 
yields the following first-order log-linearization: 
𝑦𝑦𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡 = 𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡 + 𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡 (2.25) 
where variation in 𝑧𝑧𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡 is of the second order. This expression plays a critical role in pinning 
down the dynamics of marginal cost and inflation in the equilibrium subsection; however, 





2.2.4 Price-Setting and the Firm’s Problem 
In the New Keynesian framework, price-setting follows a variation on a discrete version 
of the staggered contract pricing from Calvo (1983). In the event of an economic shock, 
this nominal price rigidity prevents each firm from fully resetting its price to the new 
market-clearing equilibrium. Here, the representative firm seeks to maximize the current 
value of its dividend stream, which is discounted by the stochastic discount factor and 
knowledge of not being able to fully adjust its prices. Complicating matters in this model, 
each firm has a non-negligible size and competes under Bertrand price competition. The 
asymmetry in these market shares leads to unique demand elasticities for each firm. 
 A firm’s reset price depends on its demand curvature. More specifically, it depends 
on how the price elasticity of demand changes as the firm’s price changes. As described 
in Klenow and Willis (2006), this superelasticity embodies the change in demand elasticity 
as a result of indirect changes to sector price. For example, a shock to a firm’s cost leads 
to an increase in its price; however, this firm with non-negligible market share also affects 
the sector price, which in turn leads to reactionary price adjustment behavior by 
competing firms within the sector. The net effect of this chain of events results in an 
incomplete pass-through of the initial shock—albeit through two distinct channels. 
For the firm’s problem, let 𝑃𝑃�𝑖𝑖,𝑘𝑘,𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡 denote the optimal reset price for firm 𝑖𝑖 to 
maximize the current value of its dividend stream: 
max
𝑃𝑃�𝑖𝑖,𝑘𝑘,𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡
� ℎ𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡 �𝑄𝑄𝑡𝑡,𝑡𝑡+𝑇𝑇 � �𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖,𝑘𝑘,𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡+𝑇𝑇
𝑁𝑁
𝑛𝑛=1
































where ℎ𝑇𝑇 denotes the survival proportion in period 𝑇𝑇, and 𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡+𝑇𝑇𝑁𝑁𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚  denotes the nominal 
marginal cost of production for country 𝑛𝑛. Additionally, 𝜔𝜔𝑖𝑖,𝑘𝑘,𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚 ≡ 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖,𝑘𝑘,𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚𝛼𝛼𝑘𝑘,𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚𝛼𝛼𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚 and 




When the goods market clears, the above binding constraint can be substituted 
into the firm’s optimization problem and written as: 
max
𝑃𝑃�𝑖𝑖,𝑘𝑘,𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡
































�𝑃𝑃�𝑖𝑖,𝑘𝑘,𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡 + �𝑃𝑃�𝑖𝑖,𝑘𝑘,𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡 − 𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡+𝑇𝑇𝑁𝑁𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚 ��−𝛾𝛾 + (𝛾𝛾 − 𝜃𝜃)𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘,𝑡𝑡 + (𝜃𝜃 − 𝜂𝜂)𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡��� = 0 (2.28) 
where 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘,𝑡𝑡 ≡ ∑ �𝜕𝜕𝑃𝑃𝑘𝑘,𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡+𝑇𝑇 𝜕𝜕𝑃𝑃�𝑖𝑖,𝑘𝑘,𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡⁄ ��𝑃𝑃�𝑖𝑖,𝑘𝑘,𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡 𝑃𝑃𝑘𝑘,𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡+𝑇𝑇⁄ �𝑁𝑁𝑛𝑛=1  and denotes the partial price 
elasticity of the sector price for goods produced in country 𝑛𝑛 and consumed in country 𝑚𝑚. 
As shown in Appendix 2.B.1, the firm’s sector market share for country 𝑚𝑚 equals 









Using this equivalence, I substitute in the firm’s market share into the first-order condition. 
This substitution determines the role of the firm’s market share in its price response. 
To find the firm’s partial optimal reset price, I substitute the sector market share 









�𝑃𝑃�𝑖𝑖,𝑘𝑘,𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡 + �𝑃𝑃�𝑖𝑖,𝑘𝑘,𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡 − 𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡+𝑇𝑇𝑁𝑁𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚 � �(𝛾𝛾 − 𝜃𝜃)𝜔𝜔𝑖𝑖,𝑘𝑘,𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘 − 𝛾𝛾��� = 0 (2.30) 
then solve for the price: 
𝑃𝑃�𝑖𝑖,𝑘𝑘,𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡 =
𝛾𝛾 − (𝛾𝛾 − 𝜃𝜃)𝜔𝜔𝑖𝑖,𝑘𝑘,𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘
𝛾𝛾 − (𝛾𝛾 − 𝜃𝜃)𝜔𝜔𝑖𝑖,𝑘𝑘,𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘 − 1
𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡+𝑇𝑇𝑁𝑁𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚  (2.31) 
where the partial price elasticity equals: 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑘𝑘,𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛾𝛾�1 − 𝜔𝜔𝑖𝑖,𝑘𝑘,𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘 � + 𝜃𝜃𝜔𝜔𝑖𝑖,𝑘𝑘,𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘 . Consider 
two scenarios to better understand this demand elasticity function. First, a firm with no 
sector market share would face a demand elasticity of 𝛾𝛾. Second, a firm that has a sector 




Thus far, the firm’s demand elasticity only captures its direct price response. In the 
spirit of Kimball’s superelasticity, I now incorporate any sector price feedback. To begin, 






(1 − 𝛾𝛾)(𝛾𝛾 − 𝜃𝜃)𝜔𝜔𝑖𝑖,𝑘𝑘,𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘
𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑘𝑘,𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡(𝜔𝜔)
� �?̂?𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑘𝑘,𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡 − ?̂?𝑝𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡� (2.32) 
where Equation 2.32 expresses the partial elasticity in log-differences. I then use this 
elasticity to express the firm’s price in log-differences: 




�(1− 𝛾𝛾)(𝛾𝛾 − 𝜃𝜃)𝜔𝜔𝑖𝑖,𝑘𝑘,𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘 � 
In this expression, the firm’s price depends on its sector price and marginal cost. 
As shown in Appendix 2.B.2, the firm’s price response from Equation 2.33 can be 
rewritten as a function of only marginal costs: 
Τ(𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚� )𝑖𝑖,𝑘𝑘,𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡 ≡ ?̂?𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑘𝑘,𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 = Λ𝑖𝑖,𝑘𝑘,𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘











+ Λ𝑖𝑖,𝑘𝑘,𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚�𝑖𝑖,𝑘𝑘,𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡 (2.34) 
where Λ𝑖𝑖,𝑘𝑘,𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 ≡ �1 − Γ𝑖𝑖,𝑘𝑘,𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘 �
−1 and denotes the partial own cost elasticity of varietal 
price. Likewise, Λ𝑖𝑖,𝑘𝑘,𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘 ≡ −Γ𝑖𝑖,𝑘𝑘,𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘 �1 − Γ𝑖𝑖,𝑘𝑘,𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘 �
−1 and denotes the partial sector-price 
elasticity of varietal price. Simply put, Equation 2.34 represents how a firm will adjust its 
price in response to a marginal cost shock, whether its own shock or a competitors. 
Next, I combine Equation 2.34 with the log-linearization of the first order condition 
the firm’s optimal reset price: 




where the firm’s forward-looking pricing decision depends on its unique demand elasticity 




Without loss of generality, I extend Equation 2.35 to find the country-level optimal 
reset price: 








0  and ?̅?𝑝𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡 represents the optimal reset 
prices of goods produced by country 𝑛𝑛 and consumed by country 𝑚𝑚. Equation 2.36 implies 
that the price for goods produced in country 𝑛𝑛 and consumed in country 𝑚𝑚 has an effect 
on the CPI for country 𝑚𝑚. That is, this model entails non-negligible country size, where 
country size is a function of the weighted average of non-negligible firms. 
Under Calvo staggered contract pricing, the composite price for goods produced 
by country 𝑛𝑛 and consumed by country 𝑚𝑚 equals: 
𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡 = �ℎ�𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡−1�
1−𝜃𝜃





where firms adjust a proportion of 1 − ℎ of their prices, while keeping a proportion of ℎ 
constant. 
The log-linearization of Equation 2.37 around a zero-inflation steady state results 
in the following inflation expression: 
𝜋𝜋𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡 = (1 − ℎ)�?̅?𝑝𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡 − 𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡−1� (2.38) 
when combined with Equation 2.36 results in: 
𝜋𝜋𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛽𝛽𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡�𝜋𝜋𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡+1� +
(1 − ℎ)(1 − 𝛽𝛽ℎ)
ℎ
Τ(𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚� )𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡+𝑇𝑇 + 𝜖𝜖𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚  (2.39) 
where 𝜖𝜖𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚 = 𝜌𝜌𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚𝜖𝜖𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡−1𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚 + 𝑢𝑢𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚  and denotes a price shock. In the calibration section, 
this shock serves as the competitor price shock. Equation 2.39 parallels the standard 
expression found in the literature for Calvo domestic PPI inflation. This measure 
corresponds to the forward-looking aggregate decision making of firms. It reflects the 
inflation’s underlying inertia. With the firm’s equilibrium price response in hand, this paper 




2.2.5 General Equilibrium 
This subsection presents the general equilibrium conditions for multi-country DSGE 
model. To begin, the real goods market clears at the varietal level when the total 
production equals the total consumption for ∀𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝐽𝐽𝑘𝑘 varietals: 




Without loss of generality, I extend this condition for ∀𝑘𝑘 ∈ 𝑁𝑁 sectors, which represents the 
aggregate market clearing condition. 
 As shown in Appendix 2.C.1, the aggregate market clearing condition helps 
determine the intertemporal path for domestic output: 
𝑦𝑦𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡 = 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡�𝑦𝑦𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡+1� −
1
𝛼𝛼𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝜎𝜎




where 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡�Δ𝑦𝑦𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡+1� denotes the expected ROW output. This forward-looking expression 
links domestic output to the expected future outputs, weighted by the home country 
preference for country 𝑛𝑛. 
Next, Appendix 2.C.2 provides the derivation for the output gap. For conciseness, 
let the deviation of the marginal cost from its long-run steady-state value equals a scalar 
of the output gap: 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚�𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡 = Φnm𝑥𝑥𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡 + 𝜖𝜖𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚  where Φnm ≡ [𝜑𝜑 + 𝛼𝛼𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝜎𝜎] and 𝜖𝜖𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 =
𝜌𝜌𝜖𝜖𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡−1𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 + 𝑢𝑢𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 . In the calibration section, this shock serves as the exchange rate shock. 
This equation links the forward-looking inflation measure. That is, substitute in the 
output gap in place of marginal costs from Equation 2.39 to find: 
𝜋𝜋𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛽𝛽𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡�𝜋𝜋𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡+1� + 𝜅𝜅Τ�Φnm𝑥𝑥𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡�𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡 (2.42) 
where 𝜅𝜅 ≡ (1 − ℎ)(1 − 𝛽𝛽ℎ)/ℎ. Equation 2.42 represents the New Keynesian Phillips 
Curve. This expression is based on the country-level output gap, where the marginal cost 
shock occurs at the aggregate level (not the firm level). This approach is consistent with 




 Finally, as shown in Appendix 2.C.3, the New Keynesian investment–saving (IS) 
curve as a function of the output gap equals: 
𝑥𝑥𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡 = 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡�𝑥𝑥𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡+1� −
1
𝛼𝛼𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝜎𝜎
�𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡 − 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡�𝜋𝜋𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡+1� − 𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡∗ � (2.43) 
where 𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡∗ ≡ Υ + Γ𝑦𝑦𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡�Δ𝑦𝑦𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡� − Γ𝑎𝑎,𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡 and denotes the natural rate of interest, Γ𝑎𝑎,𝑛𝑛 ≡
(𝜑𝜑 + 𝛼𝛼𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝜎𝜎)−1(1 + 𝜑𝜑)(1− 𝜌𝜌)𝛼𝛼𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝜎𝜎, and Γ𝑦𝑦𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 ≡ (1/𝜎𝜎 + 𝛼𝛼𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛/𝜑𝜑)
−1(1 − 𝛼𝛼𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛). This forward-
looking expression relates the output gap at period 𝑡𝑡 to the expected future output gap at 
period 𝑡𝑡 + 1. The New Keynesian Phillips curve of Equation 2.42 and the New Keynesian 
IS curve of Equation 2.43 complete the specification of the general equilibrium conditions. 
These equations form the core of the multi-country DSGE model. The next subsection 
presents a simple monetary policy rule. 
2.2.6 Monetary Policy 
This subsection defines the monetary policy regime implemented in the calibration. A 
monetary policy regime, or rule, governs how a country’s central bank will interact with its 
economy. The rule in this paper represents a variation on the classic Taylor rule, proposed 
in 1993 by economist John Taylor. This particular type of rule governs how a central bank 
should determine its nominal interest rate based on the current inflation rate. To 
implement this rule, I utilize Calvo staggard pricing contracts to generate this necessary 
price stickiness. 
 This subsection consists of a single monetary policy regime, a CPI-based Taylor 
rule: 
𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡 = Υ + 𝜙𝜙𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡 (2.44) 
where 𝜙𝜙𝜋𝜋 > 1 and denotes the inflation rate multiplier of the target interest rate. Notice 
that this function relies on the contemporaneous inflation rate, which the central bank 
observes at the start of period 𝑡𝑡. This concludes the theoretical section of this paper. The 
next section presents empirical findings related to U.S. import prices and constructs a 




2.3 U.S. Import Prices 
This section presents the BVAR estimates of ERPT into U.S. import prices for the 
following trade partners: Canada, China, the Eurozone (19 members), Japan, and 
Mexico. At the heart of this analysis, the price-setting mechanism presented in the 
theoretical section poses two predictions. First, a U.S. trade partner will decrease its 
import price in response to a real exchange rate movement. Second, a U.S. trade partner 
will increase its import price in response to a competitor’s price increase. 
 As established in chapter one, this variation on the nested-CES demand function 
results in a u-shaped price response in market share to an exchange rate movement. 
This firm-level price response is bound between zero and one. Thus, a U.S. trade 
partner’s weighted average pass-through across all sectors is also bound between zero 
and one. Simply put, a U.S. trade partner will exhibit incomplete ERPT due to the firm-
level strategic price-setting behavior. Likewise, this model predicts a hump-shaped price 
response in market share to a competitor’s price change. Again, this firm-level price 
response is bound between zero and one. Thus, the U.S. trade partner’s weighted 
average price reaction across all sectors is bound between zero and one. In the first 
subsection, I define the data and their sources. 
2.3.1 U.S. Import Price Analysis Data 
In this subsection, I present the data and their sources. These variables consist of U.S. 
import prices, CPIs, exchange rates, and import values. After identifying the data, I then 
define the competitor import price indices. 
To begin, I obtain monthly import prices indices by trade partner from the U.S. 
Bureau of Labor Statistics, by origin for all North American Industry Classification System 
(NAICS) goods. The dataset spans January 2010 to July 2020. To capture the significant 
trade volume beyond the aforementioned five major U.S. trade partners, I construct an 
additional group, the ROW. For comparison purposes, I reindex these series. As shown 
in Figure 2.3 and Table 2.1, Canada and the ROW are the most volatile U.S. import prices, 




Next, I obtain the monthly nominal bilateral exchange rates from the Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System. These series reflect the value of the trade 
partner’s currency to the U.S. dollar. Again, for comparison purposes, I reindex these 
series. As shown in Figure 2.4 and Table 2.2, the U.S. dollar has appreciated most against 
the Mexican peso and least against the Chinese yuan. Additionally, the Japanese yen 
displays the most volatility, whereas the Canadian dollar, the Chinese yuan, and the Euro 
display the least. 
To find the bilateral real exchange rates, I obtain monthly CPI data by trade partner 
from the International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics. These series 
reflect the changes in the cost of goods and services for the average consumer. Next, I 
deflate the nominal exchange rates by their respective CPIs to construct the bilateral real 
exchange rates. As before, I reindex these series. As shown in Figure 2.5 and Table 2.3, 
most bilateral real exchange rates depreciate against the U.S. between 2010 and 2016, 
then stabilize; however, the Chinese yuan breaks with this trend and appreciates over the 
full span of the series. 
To estimate the U.S. import market shares, I obtain monthly import trade value by 
trade partner from the DESA/UNSD, United Nations Comtrade Database. These series 
contain the total of all HS commodities. I estimate import market shares for each period 





where 𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡 denotes the U.S. import value of goods from trade partner 𝑚𝑚. As shown in 
Figure 2.6 and Table 2.4, the ROW accounts for the largest import share (30%-40%), 
whereas Japan accounts for the smallest (4%-6%). Additionally, China represents the 
largest single trade partner (10%-24%). In particular, this import share displays a 
significant cyclical component. In the next subsection, I address the data seasonality and 





 In addition to the above data sources, I construct competitor import price indices 
for each U.S. trade partner: 
𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚 = �1 − 𝛼𝛼𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡�
−1
�𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 − 𝛼𝛼𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡� (2.46) 
where 𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚 denotes the competitor import price for trade partner 𝑚𝑚 and 𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 denotes the 
overall U.S. import price. Notice that I normalize these competitor prices based on their 
estimated import market shares. The next subsection presents the methodology for the 
U.S. import price BVAR estimates. 
2.3.2 BVAR Methodology 
This subsection presents the methodology for testing the aggregate level predictions from 
the theoretical section. Using a BVAR model, I regress U.S. import prices by trade partner 
on their respective bilateral real exchange rates and competitor prices. The first prediction 
states that a trade partner should decrease its U.S. import price by less than the exchange 
rate movement. The second prediction states that a trade partner should increase its U.S. 
import price in response to a competitor price increase. The findings of this subsection 
confirm these predictions for all five U.S. trade partners. 
The BVAR model follows Litterman (1986) to impose parameter restrictions and 
achieve shrinkage. I utilize the Litterman/Minnesota prior with the full classical VAR initial 
covariance to capture interaction across variables. Additionally, I correct for degrees of 
freedom under the prior specification of hyper-parameters, setting the autoregressive 
coefficient to zero. For the residual priors, I set the overall tightness to 0.1, the relative 
cross-variable weight to 0.99, and the lag decay to 1. Finally, I perform a similar analysis 
using the Normal-Wishart prior, and the Sims-Zha priors, and I find robust results. 
Before estimating these BVAR models, I seasonally adjust all price indices and 
exchange rates using the U.S. Census X-13 methodology. Consistent with Campa and 
Goldberg (2005), I take the log-differences to match my multi-country DSGE model. Next, 
I verify the stationarity of all variables by checking for unit roots using an Augmented 
Dickey-Fuller test. I choose a single lag for each trade partner. The results show that no 




My BVAR model specification originates from Equation 2.36 in the theoretical 
section, which links a country’s import prices to marginal costs (own and competitor). 
Again, in practice, we cannot observe these costs and instead focus on exchange rate 
movements. Using the log-difference, the U.S. trade partner import price equals: 
Δ𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽1Δɋ𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛿𝛿1Δ𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡−1𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚  +  𝜃𝜃1Δ𝑍𝑍𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝜖𝜖𝑡𝑡 (2.47) 
where Δ𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡 denotes the log-difference of the trade partner import price, Δɋ𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡 denotes 
the log-difference of the bilateral real exchange rate, and Δ𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚  denotes the log-
difference of the competitor import price for trade partner 𝑚𝑚. Additionally, Δ𝑍𝑍𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡 denotes 
control variables, which includes real imports and competitor exchange rates. 
2.3.3 U.S. Import Price Impulse Responses 
This subsection presents the impulse responses of U.S. import prices by trade partner. 
Following Pesaran and Shin (1998), this paper implements generalized impulses that rely 
on an orthogonal set of innovations that do not depend on the ordering of the BVAR 
variables. Instead, it places the generalized responses from the 𝑗𝑗-th variable at the top of 
the Cholesky ordering. To estimate the 95% confidence intervals for each set of impulse 
responses, I rely on Bayesian sampling of 10,000 draws with a 10% burn-in. The results 
of these impulse responses to one period innovations in exchange rates and competitor 
prices support the predicted outcomes. 
The U.S. import price response by trade partner to a generalized real exchange 
rate innovation follows the expected path. An appreciation of the bilateral real exchange 
rate for the U.S. leads to a decrease in the import price of that trade partner. Likewise, 
the U.S. import price response to a generalized nominal exchange rate innovation follows 
a similar path. In both cases, the response is, as predicted, less than one percent. Finally, 
each U.S. trade partner’s price response to a generalized competitor price innovation 
follows the predicted path, where an increase in competitor price leads to an increase in 
the trade partner’s price. In the final section, I combine these impulse response figures 




2.4 The DSGE Calibration and Estimation  
This section presents the calibration of the DSGE model to the BVAR impulse responses. 
As noted, the analysis focuses on the two predictions. First, U.S. trade partners decrease 
their import price in response to a real exchange rate movement. Second, U.S. trade 
partners increase their import price in response to a competitor price increase. In both 
cases, these responses should be less than one-to-one. 
To demonstrate these predictions, I set up the DSGE model in three steps. To 
begin, I define the common parameter values based on the findings of the prevailing 
literature. Next, I estimate the shares of the U.S. goods market by trade partner. Finally, 
I calibrate specific parameters for each trade partner. In this last step, I calibrate the model 
to a generalized one standard deviation innovation in marginal cost and competitor price. 
 In the previous section, the BVAR estimates measured each trade partner’s price 
response to a movement in its real exchange rate; however, as detailed in the firm’s price-
setting subsection, I introduce an innovation directly into the marginal cost. This 
difference, in part, identifies an important challenge of the general approach. To calibrate 
the DSGE model to the BVAR impulse responses, I must account for the exchange rate 
exposure of the imported goods. As detailed in Amiti, Itskhoki, and Konings (2014), 
imported inputs are not subject to the same exchange rate movements as domestic 
inputs, and thus, the final goods have lower pass-through rates. Additionally, as detailed 
in Gopinath, Itskhoki, Rigobon (2010), many U.S. imports are contracted in U.S. dollars, 
which further limits the potential exposure. To capture this difference, I define an 
exchange rate exposure parameter for the marginal cost: 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚�𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡 = 𝜃𝜃𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝ɋ𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡. In the third 
step, I calibrate this new parameter, along with several others. 
To begin the setup, Table 2.5 specifies the values of the common parameters used 
to estimate the DSGE model. I set the discount factor, 𝛽𝛽, such that the riskless rate of 
return on a one-period bond equals 4%. Next, I set 𝜎𝜎, 𝜑𝜑, 𝜂𝜂, and ℎ to the same values 
found in the small open economy model of Galí and Monacelli (2005). Finally, I set the 
elasticity of substitution of sector goods and the elasticity of substitution of varietal goods 




Next, I estimate market shares of the U.S. goods market by trade partner. I 
combine the import market shares from Table 2.4 with an estimated value of 65% for U.S. 
consumption of domestically produced goods. Notice that this reweighting further reduces 
the aggregate market share for each trade partner. In part, this aggregation creates 
additional noise in my model, where some foreign firms may control a substantial share 
of a given U.S. goods sector, but the trade partner’s aggregate share is much smaller. 
This difference leads to a wide variation in the estimated demand elasticity. 
 Finally, I calibrate the persistence of the marginal cost shock, the persistence of 
the competitor price shock, and the exchange rate exposure for each trade partner. As 
shown in Tables 2.6 and 2.7, these persistence parameters vary from trade partner to 
trade partner. Additionally, the exchange rate exposure values reveal even greater 
variability. As mentioned, the aggregated market shares generate substantial noise in 
these calibrations. With that said, this model still serves as an important steppingstone to 
a firm-level version with empirically estimated rates of exchange rate exposure. Now I 
turn to a brief discussion of the results. 
 Figure 2.7(a-e) shows the DSGE calibration of the U.S. import price to a real 
exchange rate shock by trade partner. In general, the calibrations capture the dynamic 
path of the estimated BVAR responses over 12 months. Interestingly, China, the 
Eurozone, and Japan all contain a lagged effect, with their peaks in the second period. 
The DSGE model, in its current form, is unable to replicate that inflation inertia. This point 
will be examined further in future works and incorporated into the existing model. 
 Next, Figure 2.8(a-e) shows the DSGE calibration of the U.S. import price to a 
competitor price shock by trade partner. In general, the calibrations capture the dynamic 
path of the estimated BVAR responses over 12 months. As before, China, Japan, and (to 
a lesser degree) the Eurozone all contain that same lagged effect, with their peaks in the 
second period. In both sets of calibrations, the multi-country DSGE model captures the 
expected signs (±), but what about the magnitudes? The model was able to come within 




First, is the variation in the persistence parameters and the exchange rate 
exposure parameter due to the noise generated from the aggregation? Second, will 
control for the exchange rate exposure at the disaggregated level still provide for 
reasonable estimates? These questions may be answered in a future work by 
incorporating the import prices at the goods level. Additionally, the exchange rate 
exposure can be estimated using input-output data at the industry level. 
2.5 Conclusion 
In conclusion, this paper presents a multi-country DSGE model. The nested-CES demand 
that underpins this framework extends works like Atkeson and Burstein (2008) and Auer 
and Schoenle (2016). It incorporates the firm’s non-negligible market share to explain the 
empirically observed incomplete ERPT. The model’s multi-country structure follows from 
works, such as Penning (2017), which show the importance of capturing the strategic 
pricing behavior by competitor firms. 
 This analysis relies on aggregated U.S. import price data. As such, the DSGE 
model provides two aggregate-level predictions. First, U.S. trade partners decrease their 
import prices in response to a real exchange rate movement. This response is due to 
firm-level strategic price-setting behavior. On average, firms of a non-negligible size will 
absorb some of the exchange rate shock to avoid losing market share to a competitor. 
Second, U.S. trade partners increase their import price in response to a competitor price 
increase. Again, this response is due to firm-level strategic price-setting behavior, where 
on average, competitor firms of non-negligible size will increase their price without losing 
market share. 
 Finally, the findings in the calibration section provided further support for these 
predictions but left unanswered questions. Specifically, the variation in the persistence 
parameters and the exchange rate exposure parameter calls into question the precision 
of the model. Future works using disaggregated price data and estimated exchange rate 







Figure 2.1: The Firm’s Price Response to a Marginal Cost Shock 
 
 





Figure 2.3: U.S. Import Prices by Trade Partner 
 
 





Figure 2.5: U.S. Real Exchange Rate by Trade Partner 
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Figure 2.7(a-e): Calibration of U.S. Import Prices by Trade Partner  
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Figure 2.8(a-e): Calibration of U.S. Import Prices by Trade Partner  






Table 2.1: U.S. Import Price Index by Trade Partner 
(2010M01 = 100) 
Trade Partner Obs. Mean S.D. Med. Min. Max. Skewness Kurtosis 
Canada 127 96.79 9.97 97.69 74.49 114.37 -0.28 -1.01 
China 127 101.44 2.17 101.10 97.71 105.18 -0.02 -1.26 
Eurozone 127 105.41 2.29 105.95 99.77 109.32 -0.80 -0.18 
Japan 127 100.34 2.49 98.98 97.04 105.21 0.61 -0.98 
Mexico 127 97.84 6.21 95.14 89.26 111.68 0.37 -1.31 
Rest of World* 127 109.55 10.07 105.87 92.77 127.22 0.33 -1.43 
World 127 103.30 6.46 100.56 93.09 114.54 0.35 -1.41 
Observations based on monthly data from 2010M01 to 2020M07. Data Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Import Price 
Index by Trade Partner for all NAICS goods. Indexed to 2010M01 = 100. 
*Rest of World denotes the U.S. import price for all trade partners except Canada, China, the Eurozone, Japan, and Mexico. 














Table 2.2: U.S. Nominal Exchange Rate by Trade Partner 
(Trade Partner Currency/U.S. Dollar) 
Trade Partner Obs. Mean S.D. Med. Min. Max. Skewness Kurtosis 
Canada 127 1.18 0.15 1.23 0.96 1.42 -0.10 -1.71 
China 127 6.53 0.30 6.50 6.05 7.11 0.21 -1.23 
Eurozone 127 0.82 0.08 0.82 0.69 0.95 -0.09 -1.47 
Japan 127 101.58 13.77 106.68 76.64 123.72 -0.48 -1.01 
Mexico 127 15.96 3.27 15.24 11.65 24.18 0.35 -1.20 
Rest of World* 127 109.60 7.16 109.71 83.11 125.39 -0.59 1.47 
World** 127 110.65 11.17 113.46 93.54 131.50 0.04 -1.61 
Observations based on monthly data from 2010M01 to 2020M07. Data Source: Bank of International Settlement, Broad 
Effective Exchange Rate for U.S. 
*Rest of World denotes the U.S. nominal exchange rate for all trade partners, except Canada, China, the Eurozone, Japan, 
and Mexico, indexed to 2010M01 = 100. 















Table 2.3: U.S. Real Exchange Rate by Trade Partner 
(CPI Adjusted Trade Partner Currency/ CPI Adjusted U.S. Dollar, 2010M01 = 100) 
Trade Partner Obs. Mean S.D. Med. Min. Max. Skewness Kurtosis 
Canada 127 113.87 14.60 118.70 91.80 136.60 -0.10 -1.70 
China 127 90.89 4.21 90.68 83.35 100.47 0.33 -0.70 
Eurozone 127 118.43 12.18 120.62 97.78 137.28 -0.08 -1.58 
Japan 127 119.83 18.06 127.57 88.00 144.19 -0.57 -1.25 
Mexico 127 111.91 15.91 107.51 90.54 153.23 0.38 -1.02 
Rest of World* 127 117.72 16.26 121.58 89.53 141.05 -0.10 -1.60 
World** 127 110.65 11.17 113.46 93.54 131.50 0.04 -0.27 
Observations based on monthly data from 2010M01 to 2020M07. Data Sources: (1) Bank of International Settlement, Broad 
Effective Exchange Rate for U.S (2) the International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, Consumer Price 
Index. 
*Rest of World denotes the U.S. nominal exchange rate for all trade partners, except Canada, China, the Eurozone, Japan, 
and Mexico. 














Table 2.4: U.S. Import Market Share by Trade Partner 
(Import Market Share Based on Import Value) 
Trade Partner Obs. Mean S.D. Med. Min. Max. Skewness Kurtosis 
Canada 127 0.13 0.01 0.13 0.09 0.16 -0.57 1.12 
China 127 0.20 0.02 0.20 0.10 0.24 -0.91 1.85 
Eurozone 127 0.14 0.01 0.14 0.12 0.19 0.41 0.10 
Japan 127 0.06 0.01 0.06 0.04 0.07 -0.79 2.20 
Mexico 127 0.13 0.01 0.13 0.09 0.16 -0.05 1.41 
Rest of World* 127 0.34 0.02 0.33 0.30 0.40 0.58 -0.27 
Observations based on monthly data from 2010M01 to 2020M07. Data Source: DESA/UNSD, United Nations Comtrade 
Database, Total of All HS Commodities by Trade Partner. 

















Table 2.5: DSGE Common Parameter Specification 
Parameter Description Value 
𝛽𝛽 Discount Factor 0.9965 
𝜎𝜎 Inverse Elasticity of Intertemporal Substitution of Consumption 1.00 
𝜑𝜑 Inverse Elasticity of Intertemporal Substitution of Labor Supply 3.00 
𝜂𝜂 Elasticity of Substitution of Domestic and Foreign Goods 1.00 
ℎ Survival Rate (Price Stickiness) 0.75 
𝜃𝜃 Elasticity of Substitution of Sector Goods 2.0 
𝛾𝛾 Elasticity of Substitution of Varietal Goods 10.0 
Discount factor based on a riskless rate of approximately 4.0%. The elasticity of substitution of 
sector goods and the elasticity of substitution of varietal goods follow the specification of Auer and 
Schoenle (2016). All other parameters follow the specification of Galí and Monacelli (2005). This 

















Table 2.6: DSGE Estimations and Calibration 
(U.S. Import Price Response by Trade Partner to a Marginal Cost Shock) 
Parameter Description Canada China Eurozone Japan Mexico 
𝛼𝛼 Share of U.S. Goods Market 0.047 0.070 0.050 0.021 0.046 
𝜌𝜌𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 Persistence of Marginal Cost Shock 0.563 0.647 0.647 0.666 0.395 
𝜃𝜃𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒 Exchange Rate Exposure 0.990 0.036 0.087 0.050 0.184 
Sector share of U.S. goods market based on import market shares identified in Table 3.4 and the author’s estimate of U.S. 
consumption of domestically produced goods. Persistence of marginal cost shock and exchange rate exposure calibrated using 




















Table 2.7: DSGE Estimations and Calibration 
(U.S. Import Price Response by Trade Partner to a Competitor Price Shock) 
Parameter Description Canada China Eurozone Japan Mexico 
𝛼𝛼 Share of U.S. Goods Market 0.047 0.070 0.050 0.021 0.046 
𝜌𝜌𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚 Persistence of Competitor Price Shock 0.632 0.250 0.294 0.300 0.497 
𝜃𝜃𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒 Exchange Rate Exposure 0.139 0.197 0.057 0.117 0.526 
Sector share of U.S. goods market based on import market shares identified in Table 3.4 and the author’s estimate of U.S. 
consumption of domestically produced goods. Persistence of competitor price shock and exchange rate exposure calibrated using 

















Appendix 2.A.1: Representative Household’s Optimal Consumption 
From the demand structure, I define the budget constraint of the representative household 









+ 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡�𝑄𝑄𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡,𝑡𝑡+1𝐷𝐷𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡+1� ≤ 𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡 + 𝑊𝑊𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡𝑁𝑁𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡 + 𝑇𝑇𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡 
where 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡 denotes the price of varietal good 𝑖𝑖 of sector 𝑘𝑘 from country 𝑚𝑚, and 
consumed by country 𝑛𝑛. 𝑄𝑄𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡,𝑡𝑡+1 denotes the stochastic discount factor for a one-period 
nominal bond payoff. 𝐷𝐷𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡+1 denotes the nominal payoff in period 𝑡𝑡 + 1 of the portfolio held 
at the end of the previous period. 𝑊𝑊𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡 denotes the nominal wage for a worker in country 
𝑛𝑛, and 𝑇𝑇𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡 denotes lump-sum transfers and taxes in country 𝑛𝑛. 
 In a competitive equilibrium, the representative household maximizes its expected 
utility across an infinite horizon by choosing its consumption of varietal goods, saving in 
the form of a one-period bond, and labor supply. The government exogenously sets the 
lump-sum transfers and taxes, and the representative household takes wage and prices 
as given. Using the current value approach, the Lagrangian for the representative 
household’s problem equals: 












where 𝜆𝜆𝑡𝑡 denotes the Lagrangian multiplier at period 𝑡𝑡, which equals the marginal utility 
of consumption for that period, discounted back to the first period. I assume that the 
typical Karush-Kuhn-Tucker condition holds, in which there exists a unique interior 
solution and 𝜆𝜆𝑡𝑡 > 0 for ∀𝑡𝑡. 
The first-order conditions with respect to the choice variables of the representative 
household’s problem equal: 
𝜕𝜕ℒ
𝜕𝜕𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡











= 0 ⇔ 𝜆𝜆𝑡𝑡𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡�𝑄𝑄𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡,𝑡𝑡+1� = 𝛽𝛽𝜆𝜆𝑡𝑡+1 
𝜕𝜕ℒ
𝜕𝜕𝜆𝜆𝑡𝑡









where the necessary condition for a relative extremum requires that each of these 
conditions equal zero. 
To find the representative household’s optimal consumption, I divide the Frisch 
demand for varietal good 𝑖𝑖 by a competing differentiated varietal good 𝑗𝑗, where 𝑗𝑗 ∈ 𝐽𝐽𝑘𝑘. 







. Next, I multiply both sides by varietal good 
𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗,𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡 and take the summation across all 𝑗𝑗 varietal goods in its sector to obtain: 
∑ 𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗,𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗,𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡
𝐽𝐽𝑘𝑘







𝑗𝑗=1 . Finally, I use the fact that the 
summation of expenditures across varietal goods for a given sector equals the total 
expenditure for that sector:∑ 𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗,𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗,𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡
𝐽𝐽𝑘𝑘
𝑗𝑗=1 = 𝐶𝐶𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡𝑃𝑃𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡. Thus, the optimal 
consumption of a varietal good equals: 






where 𝑃𝑃𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡 denotes the index price of sector 𝑘𝑘 from country 𝑚𝑚. 
Next, I define the sector price index from the indirect utility function, which is 
homogenous of degree minus one in price: 












The nested-CES demand structure in this model has three levels within the 
representative household’s problem. To find the optimal consumption condition for a 
sector good, repeat the steps from the varietal good optimization process at the sector 
level to find: 






where 𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡 denotes the price of a composite consumption good produced in country 𝑚𝑚 










The price of a composite consumption good equals a weighted average of the sector 
good prices. 
At the top level of this nested-CES demand structure, the optimal composite 
consumption of goods exported from country 𝑚𝑚 equals: 






where 𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡 denotes the CPI for country 𝑛𝑛 and equals the summation across 𝑚𝑚 ∈ 𝑁𝑁 
weighted composite country prices, including 𝑚𝑚 = 𝑛𝑛: 
















Appendix 2.B.1: The Sector Price Elasticity and Market Share 
This appendix derives the equivalence between the sector price elasticity with respect to 
the firm’s price and sector market share. Recall, the representative household’s sector 





. Without loss of generality, I substitute the firm’s reset 
price in place the varietal price. The partial derivative of this sector price with respect to 












while holding the price of competitor firms constant. 
To find a partial elasticity from the first-order condition, I multiply the above 















where this varietal partial price elasticity relates to a given sector good in country 𝑛𝑛. This 
elasticity measures how a firm’s price change affects the overall sector price, while 
holding constant the prices of competing firms within the sector. 
Next, I substitute the optimal consumption condition from the household’s problem 































where this summation derives from the first-order condition of the firm’s problem. Notice 
that this summation does not affect the numerator of the expression because that pertains 




 Under monopolistic competition, each firm has market power and the ability to 
mark up its price over marginal cost. The degree of power depends directly on each firm’s 
market share of the sector revenue. In this model, each firm can third-degree price 
discriminate across countries, which implies a unique markup in each market. Formally, I 
define the firm’s sector market share of country 𝑚𝑚 as: 







where 𝜔𝜔𝑖𝑖,𝑘𝑘,𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘  denotes the firm’s sector market share in country 𝑚𝑚. 
Using the above equation, I take the summation across all varietals in that sector, 
and across all 𝑛𝑛 ∈ 𝑁𝑁 countries. Next, I substitute the optimal consumption condition from 
























where, without loss of generality, I rewrite the above equation in terms of production. 









This equivalence allows me to substitute in the firm’s sector market share of country 𝑚𝑚 
into the first-order condition of the firm’s problem. In a sense, the firm internalizes this 








Appendix 2.B.2: The Firm’s Equilibrium Price Response 
This appendix derives the firm’s equilibrium price response as a function of marginal 







(1 − 𝛾𝛾)(𝛾𝛾 − 𝜃𝜃)𝜔𝜔𝑖𝑖,𝑘𝑘,𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘
𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑘𝑘,𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡(𝜔𝜔)
� �?̂?𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑘𝑘,𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡 − ?̂?𝑝𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡� 
where for notation convenience, I define the partial elasticity in log-differences. 
 Next, I use the above elasticity and express the firm’s price in terms of log-
differences:  




�(1− 𝛾𝛾)(𝛾𝛾 − 𝜃𝜃)𝜔𝜔𝑖𝑖,𝑘𝑘,𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘 � 
The above expression provides a glimpse of the firm’s price adjustment process, in which 
the price response works through the two channels. 
The firm’s price also appears on the right-hand side of this equation, directly as 
itself, and as elements of the sector price. Thus, solving for the specific firm’s price change 
results in: 
?̂?𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑘𝑘,𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡 =
−Γ𝑖𝑖,𝑘𝑘,𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘 �1 − 𝜔𝜔𝑖𝑖,𝑘𝑘,𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘 �?̂?𝑝𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚�𝑖𝑖,𝑘𝑘,𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡
1 − Γ𝑖𝑖,𝑘𝑘,𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘 �1 − 𝜔𝜔𝑖𝑖,𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘 �
 
where ?̂?𝑝𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 ≡ �1 − 𝜔𝜔𝑖𝑖,𝑘𝑘,𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘 �





𝑛𝑛=1  and denotes the price 
change of the rest of sector (ROS). The 𝑗𝑗 ≠ 𝑖𝑖∗ denotes that the summation across varietal 
goods excludes the firm of interest and does not apply to firms in competing counties. 
This price adjustment process builds on Atkeson and Burstein (2008). Specifically, in this 
model, feedback occurs between the firm’s price and sector price. To better understand 
the firm’s pricing behavior, I define two static price responses: First, the firm’s price 









holding the sector price constant. The figure shows the u-shaped price response in sector 
market share, as described by Auer and Schoenle (2016). A firm with a negligible sector 
market share would pass the cost to the consumers because it has no market share to 
lose. A monopoly that controls the entire sector market share would also pass some of 
the shock to the consumers because it has no sector competitors nor sector market share 
to lose. A medium-sized firm in terms of sector market share would pass the less of the 
shock to consumers because it would not want to lose any of its market share. 






, while holding the 
marginal cost constant. This figure shows the hump-shaped price response in sector 
market share described by Auer and Schoenle (2016). A firm with a negligible sector 
market share would not react because it has no market power. A sector monopoly would 
not react to ROS price shock because the firm has nothing to gain. A medium-sized firm 
in terms of sector market share would react because it could increase its price while 
maintaining its market share. 
 Next, I take the previous equation and solve the firm’s price response, but this time 
I leaves the sector price intact: 
?̂?𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑘𝑘,𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡 =
−Γ𝑖𝑖,𝑘𝑘,𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘 ?̂?𝑝𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚�𝑖𝑖,𝑘𝑘,𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡
1 − Γ𝑖𝑖,𝑘𝑘,𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘
 








= �1 − Γ𝑖𝑖,𝑘𝑘,𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘 �
−1 













To find the equilibrium price response, substitute equation Λ𝑖𝑖,𝑘𝑘,𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚  and Λ𝑖𝑖,𝑘𝑘,𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘  into 
the firm’s price response to find: 
?̂?𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑘𝑘,𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡 = Λ𝑗𝑗,𝑘𝑘,𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡
𝑗𝑗𝑘𝑘 ?̂?𝑝𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡 + Λ𝑗𝑗,𝑘𝑘,𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚�𝑗𝑗,𝑘𝑘,𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡 
In a sense, this function represents the best response of a firm, where the firm’s price 
response depends on the sector price shock and marginal cost shock. 
Next, substitute this best response function into the sector price for ∀𝑗𝑗 ∈ 𝐽𝐽𝑘𝑘 firms: 





𝑛𝑛=1 , where 𝜔𝜔𝑗𝑗,𝑘𝑘,𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡
𝑗𝑗𝑘𝑘  represents the firm’s sector market 
share and weight of each firm’s effect on the sector price for country 𝑚𝑚: 
?̂?𝑝𝑘𝑘,𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡 ≡ ��𝜔𝜔𝑗𝑗,𝑘𝑘,𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡
𝑗𝑗𝑘𝑘 �Λ𝑗𝑗,𝑘𝑘,𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡





















This establishes the sector price as a function of the firm’s marginal cost. 
 To find the firm’s equilibrium price as a function of marginal costs, I substitute the 
sector price response into the firm’s price response: 
Τ(𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚� )𝑖𝑖,𝑘𝑘,𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡 ≡ ?̂?𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑘𝑘,𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 = Λ𝑖𝑖,𝑘𝑘,𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘










+ Λ𝑖𝑖,𝑘𝑘,𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚� 𝑖𝑖,𝑘𝑘,𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡 
This equation represents how a firm will adjust its price in response to a marginal cost 







Appendix 2.C.1: Forward-Looking Domestic Output 
This appendix derives a forward-looking expression for domestic output. To begin, the 
real goods market clears at the varietal good level when the total production equals the 
total consumption: 




where the total output of a varietal good from country 𝑛𝑛 equals consumption across all 
𝑚𝑚 ∈ 𝑁𝑁 countries. From here, I substitute in the varietal-level and sector-level optimal 
consumption conditions into the above equation to find: 






















Notice that this expression includes the currency denomination. To solve for the market-
clearing condition, I must use a common currency denomination; however, the optimal 
consumption condition for each good depends on the local currency of country 𝑚𝑚, for 
∀𝑚𝑚 ∈ 𝑁𝑁 countries. 
The market-clearing condition holds for all varietal goods, where the composite 
consumption good for country 𝑛𝑛 equals the summation across all varieties and sectors: 












From this aggregate output equation, I solve for production as a function of consumption: 















where I maintain the assumption that 𝜁𝜁𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚 = 1. This equation now expresses goods and 
prices in the common currency of country 𝑛𝑛. For this reason, all subsequent equations in 




 Consider the particular case in which 𝜎𝜎 = 𝜂𝜂 = 1. Notice that the domestic CPI level 
for country 𝑛𝑛 equals: 𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡 = ∏ �𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡�
𝛼𝛼𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑁𝑁
𝑚𝑚=1 . Using this expression, I divide both sides by 
the PPI to find: 𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡𝑛𝑛 /𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛~,𝑡𝑡 = ∏ �𝑆𝑆𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡�
𝛼𝛼𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑁𝑁−1
𝑚𝑚=1,𝑚𝑚≠𝑛𝑛 , where 𝑆𝑆𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡 ≡ 𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡/𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡 ≡ 1. Thus, 
under this special case, the market clearing condition can be written as: 





where the composite consumption times the product of the bilateral terms of trade equals 
the overall production for country 𝑛𝑛. 
Next, I take the first order log-linearization of the above equation to find the 
following expression: 
𝑦𝑦𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡 = 𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡 − (1 − 𝛼𝛼𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛)𝑠𝑠𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡 
This implies that gains in the effective ToT led to offsetting increases in consumption and 
decreases in output. For example, an increase in the effective ToT for country 𝑛𝑛 means 
that wealth has increased for households in country 𝑛𝑛. Thus, at the margin, these 
households respond by consuming more and working less. 
To find a more generalized version of the real goods market-clearing condition, 
substitute Equation 2.17 from the main text in place of the bilateral RER. The first order 
log-linearization of this expression around the zero-inflation steady state equals: 
𝑦𝑦𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡 = 𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡 + �𝜂𝜂 −
1
𝜎𝜎
− 1� (1 − 𝛼𝛼𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛)𝑠𝑠𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡 
For consistency, notice that under the same special case conditions as before the 
domestic output simplifies to that of the previous special case scenario; however, the 
generalized expression provides new insight into the role of 𝜂𝜂 and 1/𝜎𝜎 on trade. Recall 
that 𝜂𝜂 denotes the elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign composite 





 The next series equations involve on the ROW output and the ROW consumption, 




















where 𝑦𝑦𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡 ≡ (1 − 𝛼𝛼𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛)−1 ∑ 𝛼𝛼𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑦𝑦𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡𝑁𝑁−1𝑚𝑚=1,𝑚𝑚≠𝑛𝑛  and denotes the ROW output. This 
specification implies symmetric bilateral weights across production and consumption. 
Next, 𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡 ≡ (1 − 𝛼𝛼𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛)−1 ∑ 𝛼𝛼𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡𝑁𝑁−1𝑚𝑚=1,𝑚𝑚≠𝑛𝑛  and denotes the ROW consumption. 
Using the cross-country consumption condition from Equation 2.19 from the main 
text, take the weighted summation across all 𝑚𝑚 ∈ 𝑁𝑁 countries and substitute in the above 
output expression to find: 






(1 − 𝛼𝛼𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛)𝑠𝑠𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡 
where consumption for country 𝑛𝑛 equals a function of its output, the ROW output, and its 
weighted effective ToT. 
Next, I substitute in the output in place of domestic consumption to find the 
following expression: 
𝑦𝑦𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡 = 𝑦𝑦𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡 + (𝜂𝜂 − 1)𝑠𝑠𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡 
where the domestic output of country 𝑛𝑛 depends on the ROW output and effective ToT. 
 Finally, I establish an intertemporal relationship for domestic output. Using the 
intertemporal consumption condition, I substitute in Equation 2.13 from the main text in 
place of the domestic CPI inflation rate. Next, I substitute for domestic consumption. 
Finally, I simplify and replace the effective ToT with the first difference of the above output 
equation to find: 
𝑦𝑦𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡 = 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡�𝑦𝑦𝑛𝑛,𝑡𝑡+1� −
1
𝛼𝛼𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝜎𝜎




This forward-looking domestic output expression depends on the expected future output, 






The Impact of U.S. Monetary Policy on Corporate Revenues1 
 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter explores the impact of U.S. monetary policy on corporate revenues. Using 
a structural vector autoregression (SVAR) model, we find cross-sector heterogeneity to 
an unanticipated increase in the federal funds rate. This framework provides new insights 
into the sector characteristics that determine the impact of monetary transmission. 
Uniquely, our model includes a dynamic factor to capture any spillover effects from sector 
output. 
 Following Dedola and Lippi (2005), our approach focuses on the sector-based 
effects of monetary policy to better understand the underlying monetary transmission 
mechanism. The federal funds rate has long influenced the U.S. economy, including 
through the prime rate—the prevailing rate at which banks charge their best customers 
to borrow funds. The prime rate also affects other rates, such as the interest rates on 
deposits, bank loans, and credit cards. As these rates increase, businesses face higher 
borrowing costs, an increase in debt-servicing costs, and decreased consumer demand. 
 We begin by estimating the real revenue effects of an unanticipated monetary 
shock. To accomplish this task, we construct an SVAR model for eleven sectors under 
the Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS) taxonomy. These sector groupings 
are driven by principal business activity, as determined by their revenues. We focus on 
real revenues because previous works such as Bernanke and Gertler (1995) have 
documented differences in consumption spending based on the durability of the goods. 
Likewise, Peersman and Smets (2005) have found similar evidence of cross-sector 
heterogeneity in output responses to monetary tightening. 
 
1 This chapter stems from a research project with Professor Merih Uctum (muctum@gc.cuny.edu) 
and Dr. Miguel Acosta-Henao (macosta@gradcenter.cuny.edu). I am indebted to them both for their 




We estimate the sensitivity of revenues to U.S. interest rates using macroeconomic 
variables, as well as sector-specific variables. This partially disaggregated framework 
allows us to identify better the channels through which monetary policy works, where 
these channels may not otherwise be visible using aggregated data. The SVAR model 
includes a dynamic factor constructed using a Kalman filter to capture the spillover effect 
of sector-level growth in output. From the SVAR models, we estimate the impulse 
responses of sector revenues to an unanticipated one percentage point innovation in the 
federal funds rate. 
These impulse responses reveal heterogeneity in real revenue responses across 
sectors. We attribute these uneven responses, in part, to the credit channel and the 
interest rate channel. The credit channel relates to credit access by firms and households. 
Simply put, an increase in interest rates typically coincides with a decrease in access to 
credit. In contrast, the interest rate channel follows the more conventional economic 
relationship between short-run interest rates, the cost of capital, and investment. An 
increase in short-term rates also affects long-term rates as described by the expectations 
hypothesis, which affects the cost of capital and reduces investment and output. 
In addition to the main SVAR model specification, we consider several alternatives 
for robustness. First, we consider the Wu-Xia (2016) shadow rates in place of the federal 
funds rate. The shadow rates take into account asset purchases by the Fed during periods 
in which the fed funds rate is at its zero-lower bound. These shadow rates better represent 
the Fed’s overall monetary policy stance at any given moment in time. Second, we 
remove recessionary periods as a check to the model’s sensitivity to non-normal 
economic periods. For example, consider the Housing Crisis of 2007. This period weighed 
heavily on the financials and real estate sectors and did not reflect normal times. 
In section two, we provide background information to motivate the paper. Section 
three defines the data and empirical model to measure the impact of U.S. monetary policy 
on corporate net profits. Section four presents the sector-level empirical results. Finally, 




3.2 A Background 
This section presents background information on past U.S. recessions and recoveries. It 
charts a course of how the coming years may unfold in the post-pandemic world. This 
background provides insight on why the United States may experience steady inflation 
above 2% moving forward and its implications on monetary policy. While none of the 
current economic forecasts show runaway inflation, the Fed will eventually act, whether 
through a gradual tightening, like the Great Recession of 2008, or a swift action meant to 
blunt any upward price momentum. In totality, this section provides relevance on the 
underlying question of how U.S. monetary tightening impacts corporate revenues across 
sectors. 
 On the surface, the COVID-19 Recession shares some similarities to the Great 
Recession of 2008. In April 2020, the U.S. employment rate peaked at 14.8%, 
representing the highest rate since the Great Depression. However, the sectors most 
impacted by the pandemic greatly differ from the previous crisis. As shown in Figure 3.1, 
the NAICS sectors of the arts, entertainment, recreation, accommodation, and food 
services industries decreased by 46% in output between 2019Q2 and 2020Q2.2 This 
sharp decline directly resulted from the government-mandated shelter-in-place, travel 
restrictions, and business occupancy limitations. 
 Somewhat lost in the chaos of 2020 was that the National Bureau of Economic 
Research set the start of the COVID-19 Recession in February 2020—a month before 
the World Health Organization declared the virus outbreak a global health emergency. 
Nevertheless, this date is consistent with other early indicators, such as the 10-year to 2-
year U.S. treasury yield spread. Historically, if the 10-year yield drops below the 2-year 
yield, the U.S. economy will likely enter a recession in the coming months. As shown in 
Figure 3.2, the yield curve briefly inverted in August 2019.3 Thus, the United States faced 
an elevated risk of recession before the pandemic even arrived. 
 
2 According to the U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, the arts, 
entertainment, recreation, accommodation, and food services industry decreased by 46% between 2019Q2 
and 2020Q2. The mining industry closely followed, with a decrease of 45%. 
3 According to the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, before the start of the last three U.S. 




 In total, the United States lost 24 million jobs during the first three weeks of the 
COVID-19 pandemic. Unfortunately, many of these workers have yet to re-enter the 
workforce. Despite this devastation, the U.S. GDP rebounded sharply in 2020Q3. This 
news gives policymakers hope that the United States will make a rapid, v-shaped 
recovery rather than a sluggish, u-shaped recovery. 
 We now turn to the past recessions and recoveries. To begin, we examine the four 
most recent U.S. recessions. Figure 3.3 provides the real GDP growth from trough to 
peak. Notice the strong recovery from the 1981 to 1982 Recession, where the real GDP 
increased by 38.0% from 1982 to 1990. During that same period, the U.S. debt to GDP 
ratio rose from 30.8% to 49.7%. Ultimately, this deficit spending under the Reagan 
Administration led to inflation’s resurgence during the second half of the 1980s.4 
 In contrast, the Early 1990s Recession faced less headwind than its predecessor. 
The Fed had steadily raised interest rates from 1986 to 1989, which relieved some of the 
growing inflationary pressure. But the accumulation of government debt and the Gulf War 
weighed down on consumer confidence, which pushed the economy into a short 
recession. The subsequent recovery lasted through the remainder of the Bush 
Administration and both terms of the Clinton Administration. During this period, the real 
GDP increased by 41.7%. As shown in Figure 3.4, the public debt to GDP ratio decreased 
from 57.7% to 54.2%. It was at this time that economists noticed a change in the 
traditional trade-off between unemployment and inflation. 
 Before the 1990s, the pattern between unemployment and inflation seemed to 
follow the conventional downward-sloping Phillips curve. However, the curve flattened by 
the second half of the decade. During an interview in 2018, St. Louis Fed President James 
Bullard was asked what happened to the Phillips curve.5 He stated that the Fed had killed 
it through mindful inflation targeting. The Fed’s sound policy had weakened the link over 
time between prices and unemployment until the relationship all but disappeared. 
 
4 According to the BLS, the CPI inflation rate was 13.5% in 1980. By 1983, the inflation rate had 
decreased to 3.2%. However, inflation rebounded in the second half of the decade and hit 5.4% by 1990. 
5 “Is It Time for the Fed to Say Goodbye to the Phillips Curve Theory?” All Things Considered. 




 In March 2001, the United States entered a mild recession—almost one decade 
after the previous one ended. By that time, the dot-com bubble had already burst and 
taken the wind of the U.S. economy’s sail. During this recession, real gross investment 
decreased by 11.8%, contributing to Fed Chairperson Greenspan’s fear of a deeper 
decline.6 As shown in Figure 3.5, the Fed swiftly responded to this crisis and cut the 
federal funds rate from 6.5% in late 2000 to 1.75% in December 2001. 
 In June of 2004, early signs of a housing bubble had emerged, and the Fed began 
swiftly raising the federal funds rate from its low of 1%. In June of 2006, the target rate 
had climbed to 5.25%. By that time, the housing bubble was in full swing, and mortgage 
default rates were rising. Over the next two years, the Fed held rates steady, hoping that 
it could avert another recession. These higher rates pushed mortgage rates upward, 
making it even more difficult for subprime borrowers to refinance their adjustable-rate 
mortgages. In turn, the housing market collapsed. 
In December 2007, the United States officially entered an economic recession—
its most significant since the Great Depression. As shown in Figure 3.5, from July 2007 
to December 2008, the Fed cut the federal funds target rate from 5.25% to 0%. For the 
next seven years, the federal funds rate would remain up against its zero-lower bound. 
As shown in Figure 3.6, the Fed’s balance sheet ballooned from $900 billion to $4.5 trillion 
during that same period. 
 We take away two key insights about the Fed’s likely course of action going forward 
from these most recent recessions. First, the Fed is consistent in its stance not to raise 
rates until it is confident that the U.S. economy has fully regained its momentum. Second, 
when signs emerge of upward price pressure or a market bubble, the Fed will act swiftly. 
In conjunction with the current economic climate, these lessons set the stage for the 
coming years as the COVID-19 pandemic nears its hopeful end, and the United States 
looks to push past the fallout and get the economy back on track. This concludes the 
background section. 
 
6 According to the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. real gross investment decreased from 




3.2 Data and Methodology 
With the current economic backdrop set, this section defines the data and presents the 
methodology to measure the impact of monetary tightening on corporate revenues. Our 
model relies on both macroeconomic and more granular, sector-level data. This approach 
allows us to isolate the heterogeneity in responses across sectors. This paper builds on 
a string of literature that attributes the uneven responses across sectors to the interest 
rate channel and the credit channel. In addition to these channels, we control for 
exchange rates and spillover from other sectors. Dedola and Lippi (2005) noted that the 
SVAR model provides an ideal framework for examining monetary policy relationships 
because we can control the interaction between variables. 
3.2.1 Data 
This subsection defines the data used to estimate each sector’s sensitivity to monetary 
tightening. Our empirical model depends on quarterly data, which spans from 1996Q1 to 
2017Q3. As detailed in the next subsection, the SVAR model for each sector consists of 
five variables: real sector revenues, sector debt to equity, the real exchange rate, the 
federal funds rate, and a factor to capture any output spillover effects. 
 To begin, we construct the revenues using a sampling of firm-level GICS data, 
aggregated at the 2-digit sector level. This dataset spans 1996Q1 to 2017Q3. As shown 
in Table 3.1, the GICS consists of eleven sectors containing 24 industry groups. This 
system provides even more granular firm groupings, with 69 industries and 158 sub-
industries. In 1999, Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) partnered with the S&P 
Dow Jones Indices to construct this classification system. 
 At the 2-digit level, the GICS is comprised of the following eleven sectors: (1) 
energy; (2) materials; (3) industrials; (4) consumer discretionary; (5) consumer staples; 
(6) health care; (7) financials; (8) information technology; (9) telecommunication services; 
(10) utilities; and (11) real estate. On an annual basis, MSCI and S&P Dow Jones Indices 





 Next, we deflate the aggregate 2-digit GICS revenues using the U.S. BLS, CPI for 
All Urban Consumers: All Items in the U.S. City Average. For comparison purposes, we 
then index all real revenues to 1996Q1=100.7 As shown in Table 3.2, the real estate 
sector had the highest average performance during this period, with 785.25. The real 
estate sector’s performance reflects the housing boom of the early 2000s, which turned 
into a crisis during the second half of the decade. According to the S&P/Case Shiller U.S. 
National Home Price index, home prices increased by 126% during the run-up to the 
housing crisis. After the bubble burst in 2007, home prices fell through 2012, and then the 
sector appeared to regain its footing. 
 As shown in Table 3.2, from 1996Q1 to 2017Q3, the materials and industrials 
sectors have the weakest average performances, with 168.15 and 190.45, respectively. 
Additionally, Figure 3.10(a-k) provides time series plots for each sector. The plots for 
materials and industrials explain in part their lackluster growth in revenues. The materials 
sector underperformed until the final years of the housing boom, whereas the industrials 
sector experienced a boom in the late-1990s but then underperformed through the early 
2000s. In part, the rise in global competition from China and other developing countries 
during this period explains this performance. While the increased international demand 
drove prices up, the increase in competition eroded U.S. market share. 
 The next dataset consists of 2-digit GICS debt to equity by sector, calculated using 
weighted firm-level averages. We do not deflate this series because it is comprised of the 
ratio between two nominal variables. The debt to equity is calculated using the total debt 
and book value of the shareholders’ equity.8 As shown in Table 3.3, the financials sector 
far and above has the highest debt to equity, with a ratio of 25.0. The next closest sector 
is real estate, with a ratio of 7.02. As shown in Figure 3.11(a-k), the financials sector’s 
debt to equity ratio peaked around the financial crisis, with a ratio of 42.71. This degree 
of leverage reflects the over-reliance on financial derivatives. 
 
7Indexing real revenues to a single period result in some sensitivity to the index date. For example, 
if a given sector’s revenue underperformed in the base period, all subsequent values would suggest a 
stronger relative performance. 
8 Although we do not go beyond total debt in this work, Peersman and Smets (2005) more closely 
examine the role of debt structure. Specifically, they consider how short-term debt as a share of total debt 




 Next, notice the energy sector’s low average debt to equity ratio of 1.39. During 
the mid-2000s, energy prices surged, enabling many oil and gas companies to reduce 
their debt burden. Around 2012—when the United States seemingly regained its 
economic footing—the energy sector’s debt to equity ratio began to climb. In 2014, the 
collapse of oil prices pushed energy companies to turn to debt financing and caused this 
ratio to spike. Since that time, the average debt to equity ratio has remained between 3.0 
and 4.0. Even at this new normal range, the energy sector debt to equity remains in line 
with other sectors. 
 In addition to the sector-level datasets described above, this paper relies on three 
macroeconomic variables. The next series in our model consists of the effective federal 
funds rate from the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. As shown in 
Figure 3.5, the federal funds rate has steadily declined since the 1980s. Furthermore, 
since the early 2000s, the rate has remained under 6-percent. During the Great 
Recession of 2008, the Fed lowered the target rate to zero, up against the lower bound. 
This policy created a liquidity trap, which led the Fed to find other vehicles for steering the 
U.S. economy out of the recession. 
 The fourth series is the U.S. real broad effective exchange rate from the Bank for 
International Settlements. This rate is calculated as the weighted averages of bilateral 
exchange rates, adjusted by relative consumer prices. As shown in Figure 3.8, the 
exchange rate follows long cycles, with peaks in 2002 and 2016. Notice the 
counterintuitive appreciation of the U.S. dollar during the Great Recession. Explanations 
for this movement range from a shortage of U.S. dollars to a reversal of carry-trade. 
Our model’s final variable is the dynamic factor, which captures the potential effect 
of any output spillover across sectors. A factor is a data-reduction technique that links an 
unobservable latent variable to observable ones through their covariance or correlation. 
In its simplest form, a factor captures the contemporaneous relationship between 
variables. However, an assumption that these variables are independent over time may 
not be well-suited in this instance. That is, the change in real output in one sector may 
have both contemporaneous and dynamics effects on other sectors. Thus, we construct 




To estimate our dynamic factor, we build a model using the 2-digit GICS real 
outputs for each sector: 
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 =  𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 +  𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 (3.01) 
where: 
𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 =  𝜙𝜙𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝑣𝑣𝑡𝑡  
In Equation 3.01, 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 denotes the real revenue of sector 𝑖𝑖 at time 𝑡𝑡, and 𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 denotes the 
unobserved dynamic factor. Additionally, 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡~𝑁𝑁(0,𝜎𝜎2) and 𝑣𝑣𝑡𝑡~𝑁𝑁(0,1) denote 
independent disturbance terms, where {𝛼𝛼1,𝛼𝛼2, … ,𝛼𝛼11;𝛽𝛽1,𝛽𝛽2, … ,𝛽𝛽11;𝜎𝜎1,𝜎𝜎2, … ,𝜎𝜎11;𝜙𝜙 } are 
the unknown parameters. 
 To estimate the unknown parameters of Equation 3.01, we use the Kalman filter. 
Under this technique, the model represents a state-space system, where the first equation 
denotes the signal, and the second equation denotes the state. At time 𝑡𝑡 − 1, the best 
estimator of the factor 𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 is the conditional mean: 𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡|𝑡𝑡−1 = 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡−1[𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡], with the variance: 
𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡|𝑡𝑡−1 = 𝐸𝐸 ��𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 − 𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡|𝑡𝑡−1�
2
�. However, when new information about 𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡 becomes available, 
we construct a new, better estimator: 𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡|𝑡𝑡 = 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡[𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡], with the variance: 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡|𝑡𝑡 = 𝐸𝐸 ��𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 − 𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡|𝑡𝑡�
2
�. 
To estimate the factor, the algorithm selects initial values for 𝛽𝛽, 𝜎𝜎, and 𝜙𝜙, estimates the 
observations, and updates its initial guess. As shown in Figure 3.7, the factor has a 
general upward trend that parallels real GDP, with dips around the 2001 Recession and 
the Great Recession of 2008. 
 Beyond our initial set of variables, we consider several alternative specifications in 
the robustness subsection. In one scenario, we replace the federal funds target rate with 
the Wu-Xia (2016) shadow rates obtained from the Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve. As shown in Figure 3.15, the shadow rates take into account the zero-lower 
bound from 2008Q4 to 2015Q4 and better characterizes the term structure of interest 
rates. We find that the negative interest rates play an important role in estimating the 
impulse response functions during this period. In the next subsection, we present the 





This subsection presents the SVAR model to estimate the impact of U.S. monetary 
tightening on real revenues by sector. To begin, we prepare the data for the model by 
seasonally adjusting it using the U.S. Census X-13 methodology. Next, we transform the 
data by taking the log-differences of the spillover factor, exchange rate, debt to equity, 
and real revenues. Using the Augmented Dickey–Fuller test, we find no evidence of unit 
roots, and these series appear stationary. The log-difference transformation provides an 
intuitive interpretation in this log-log model, where the coefficient represents the elasticity 
of the 𝑌𝑌 variable with respect to the 𝑋𝑋 variable. 
 In this paper, we do not take the log-difference of the interest rate. Instead, we 
remove its linear trend and find the series stationary at the 10% level of significance. 
Alternative interest rate transformations provide higher confidence levels of stationarity.9 
For example, under a quadratic detrending, the interest rate had no evidence of a unit 
root at the 5% level of significance. Additionally, under a Hodrick-Prescott filter, the 
interest rate had no evidence of a unit root at the 1% level of significance. These 
alternative approaches may increase the confidence level that a series is stationary, but 
they come at the cost of additional smoothing of the data. This additional smoothing 
removes potentially relevant information from the series. 
With the data well-defined for the model, we now shift our focus to the underlying 
methodology. In recent years, two events have largely driven the literature to focus on 
more granular monetary policy aspects. First, the availability of disaggregated datasets, 
which allows for the analysis to occur in the first place. Second, as the world becomes a 
more interconnected and complex place, central banks face previously unforeseen 
challenges. That is, as markets evolve, so too do the channels in which they work across. 
These channels make predicting the impact of monetary policy more difficult for 
policymakers. At the same time, it presents an opportunity for policymakers to develop 
intricate, micro-based models, as well as tailored policy tools. 
 
9 The Augmented Dickey-Fuller test for the federal funds target rate is test appears to be sensitive 
to the time span as well. When we increased the range to 1980Q1 to 2017Q3, the linear-detrended of the 




Part of the literature’s focus has shifted toward better understanding the 
surrounding industry characteristics that explain some of these more nuanced channels. 
Undoubtedly, each firm faces its own unique market conditions from variations in 
corporate debt structure and supply chains. Thus, the heterogeneous response to 
monetary policy should come as no surprise to anyone. In the seminal work of Gertler 
and Gilchrist (1994), they find evidence of an uneven response by small and large 
manufacturing firms to monetary tightening. They identify two channels through which of 
monetary policy works. First, how higher interest rates affect the borrowers’ balance 
sheets. Second, the “pool” or “lending” view, which emphasizes the role of policymakers 
in regulating the pool of funds available for bank-dependent borrowers. 
In a related work, Dedola and Lippi (2005) document cross-industry heterogeneity 
in response to monetary tightening. They construct an SVAR model and measure the 
effect of an unanticipated monetary policy shock. As they note, the SVAR model provides 
an ideal framework because it allows for controlling systemic interactions between 
variables. Dedola and Lippi find that the credit channel and the interest rate channel play 
quantitatively significant roles in explaining these industry responses.  
To date, the surrounding literature seems to agree on two broad points. First, 
industries and sectors alike display heterogeneity in their responses to monetary 
tightening. Second, the credit channel and the interest rate channel play important roles 
in providing an explanation. Despite these points of agreement, the literature has yet to 
reach a consensus on the sensitivity of specific sectors to monetary tightening. 
This paper focuses on monetary policy’s impact on corporate revenues around the 
ends of the two most recent business cycles. These points in time provide us with the 
best insight into how the current COVID-19 economic recovery might look. We construct 
a five equation SVAR model for each of the eleven sectors using the 2-digit GICS data 
described in the previous subsection. The model incorporates real sector revenues, 
sector debt to equity, real exchange rates, the effective federal funds rate, and a dynamic 
factor. These explanatory variables represent channels through which monetary policy 
may directly or indirectly affect revenues. This paper seeks to provide new evidence in 




After estimating the SVAR models, we construct impulse responses to a one 
percentage point shock in the effective federal funds rate. These impulse responses 
describe the dynamics of real sector revenues over time to this unanticipated interest rate 
shock. Importantly, they allow us to quantify the sensitivity of each sector to monetary 
tightening. By constructing the impulse responses using the original SVAR models, we 
maintain control over the interaction between variables. Before we continue with this 
sensitivity analysis discussion, we first specify our SVAR model. 
To begin, Sims (1980) introduced SVAR models to overcome ad hoc restrictions, 
which include unlikely exogeneity assumptions. This innovation provided a preferable 
alternative to the conventional macroeconometric models of the time. Instead of 
individually estimating each VAR equation, the SVAR model jointly considers all the 
endogenous variables. The framework imposes minimal restrictions and provides an ideal 
environment to study the average response of endogenous variables to one-time 
structural shocks. Specifically, how an innovation in the interest rate transmits into 
corporate revenues across sectors. 
This paper’s SVAR model consists of five variables, ordered from most exogenous 
to least: 𝑍𝑍𝑡𝑡 = �𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡, 𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡, 𝑞𝑞𝑡𝑡, 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡�, where 𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡 denotes the dynamic factor to capture the sector 
spillover. Additionally, 𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡 denotes effective federal funds rate, 𝑞𝑞𝑡𝑡 denotes the real broad 
effective exchange rate, 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 denotes debt to equity for sector 𝑖𝑖, and 𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡 denotes the real 
revenue for sector 𝑖𝑖. 𝑍𝑍𝑡𝑡 is generated by the reduced-form VAR process of 𝐴𝐴(𝐿𝐿)𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡 = 𝑣𝑣𝑡𝑡. In 
this setup, 𝐴𝐴(𝐿𝐿) = 𝐼𝐼5 − 𝐴𝐴1𝐿𝐿 and 𝑣𝑣𝑡𝑡~(0,𝛴𝛴𝑢𝑢) denotes a white noise term. The corresponding 
structural form is denoted by 𝐵𝐵(𝐿𝐿)𝑍𝑍𝑡𝑡 = 𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡, where 𝐵𝐵(𝐿𝐿) = 𝐵𝐵0 − 𝐵𝐵1𝐿𝐿 = 𝐵𝐵0 𝐴𝐴(𝐿𝐿). After 
normalizing the structural shocks, 𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡~(0, 𝐼𝐼5). Next, through substitution we find 𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡 = 𝐵𝐵0𝑣𝑣𝑡𝑡. 
If 𝐵𝐵 is an invertible matrix, then 𝑣𝑣𝑡𝑡 = 𝐵𝐵0−1𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡. Thus, the effect of structural shocks, 𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡, on 
the observed variables can be obtained from the structural moving average 
representation: 
𝑍𝑍𝑡𝑡 = �𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡, 𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡, 𝑞𝑞𝑡𝑡, 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡� = 𝐵𝐵(𝐿𝐿)𝑣𝑣𝑡𝑡 = 𝐵𝐵(𝐿𝐿)𝑆𝑆𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡 = 𝐶𝐶(𝐿𝐿)𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡 (3.02) 





Next, we impose the following short-run restrictions on the 𝑆𝑆 matrix, to ensure 





















𝑆𝑆11 0 0 0 0
𝑆𝑆21 𝑆𝑆22 𝑆𝑆23 0 0
𝑆𝑆31 𝑆𝑆32 𝑆𝑆33 0 0
𝑆𝑆41 𝑆𝑆42 𝑆𝑆43 𝑆𝑆44 0





















where the macroeconomic variables in this model are exogenous to both sector-level 
variables. Additionally, we impose that the dynamic factor is not contemporaneously 
affected by any other variable and only responds to shocks of its own lag. Following works 
such as Sims and Zha (2006), we allow for short-run interaction between the interest rate 
and the exchange rate (i.e., 𝑆𝑆23 ≠ 0). 
Beyond the above short-run restrictions, we anticipate that the sector-level debt to 
equity and real revenue may have a heterogeneous response to innovations in the 
interest rate. For example, a shock to 𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡 will lead to an increase in the cost of debt 
servicing. For liquidity-constrained companies, this will result in higher total debt levels, 
as well as higher debt to equity levels. But the positive shock to interest rates may also 
induce companies to reduce borrowing or seek cheaper alternative financing options. As 
a result of the range of potential different outcomes, a sector’s average debt to equity 
response to an interest rate shock is uncertain (i.e., 𝑆𝑆42 ≶ 0). However, in general, most 
firms carry some positive level of debt. Thus, we anticipate, on average, a positive 
response. 
Next, consider that the sector-level debt to equity and real revenues may have a 
heterogeneous response to innovations in the spillover factor. That is, a positive shock to 
output in one sector may spill over into other sectors. Nevertheless, we anticipate that 
inward-oriented sectors will still have an insignificant contemporaneous reaction to the 
real exchange rate and 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖3 ≈ 0. In general, we anticipate that debt to equity will respond 





The imposed restrictions on the short-run matrix under identifies our SVAR model. 
However, we also impose the long-run neutrality of monetary policy condition. That is, we 
assume that in the long run, purchasing power parity holds and 𝛿𝛿𝑞𝑞𝑡𝑡/𝛿𝛿𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟 = 0. This 
common assumption—rooted in neoclassical economic theory—requires that the nominal 
exchange rate move one-to-one with the inflation rate spread. 
Note that we determined the optimal lag structure during the setup of our SVAR 
models by using the Bayesian Information Criteria. We found that each sector had an 
optimal lag structure of 1-quarter. Additionally, our model passed the over-identification 
likelihood-ratio test. With the SVAR model now specified, we turn the discussion to the 
impulse response functions. 
Recall that we transformed the dynamic factor, exchange rate, debt to equity, and 
real revenues by taking their log-differences. Thus, each of their units approximate 
percentage points. Additionally, after removing its linear trend, the interest rate’s units are 
still percentage points. This specification provides us a log-log format, which has the 
benefit that the results can be interpreted as elasticities. Additionally, this specification 
allows for cross-sector comparisons (e.g., apples to apples). 
After estimating 𝐶𝐶(𝐿𝐿) from the SVAR model, we then investigate how an 
unanticipated one-time innovation in federal funds rate impacts real revenues across 
sectors. The impulse response works as follows: A one percentage point change in 𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟 
transmits into the impact multipliers of the estimated 𝐶𝐶 matrix and generate the responses 
of 𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡. This shock not only affects the revenue contemporaneously, but also over time. 
 We use the EViews 11 software package to estimate the impulse responses of the 
SVAR model. In the next section, we report each sector’s cumulative impulse response 
of real revenues to an unanticipated one-period innovation in the federal funds rate. 
These responses include their respective standard errors, which we estimate using the 
Monte Carlo method with 1,000 repetitions. In addition to the impulse responses, we 
compare across sectors at 4-quarters and 12-quarters after the innovation. This 
comparison allows us to rank the relative sensitivity of different sectors to monetary 




3.3 SVAR Model and Impulse Response Results 
This section reports the empirical findings of the impact of monetary tightening on 
corporate revenues. The results in this section focus on the cumulative impulse 
responses of real revenues to a one-period unanticipated innovation in the federal funds 
rate. These findings reveal heterogeneity in responses across sectors. In addition to the 
impulse responses, we examine the 4-quarter and 12-quarter cumulative responses 
across sectors. 
To supplement the main findings, we provide a robustness subsection with the 
results of two alternative model specifications. These alternative approaches provide 
additional insight into the main results and help isolate some elements influencing each 
sector’s response. These findings prove beneficial to our overall analysis and provoke 
general discussion on the observed differences across model specifications. In the first 
approach, we use the Wu-Xia (2016) shadow rates in place of the effective federal funds 
rate. In the second approach, we control for the effect of recessions on these responses. 
3.3.1 SVAR Model Impulse Responses 
This subsection presents the impulse responses of real revenues to an innovation in 
interest rates. The data spans the two most recent U.S. recessions, which provides us 
with the best insight into how the current COVID-19 economic recovery might look in the 
coming years. This analysis consists of a five equation SVAR model for each of the eleven 
sectors using the 2-digit GICS data. Our models incorporate real sector revenues, sector 
debt to equity, real exchange rates, the effective federal funds rate, and a dynamic factor. 
We find evidence in support of the heterogeneous responses across sectors. 
As shown in Figure 3.12(a-k), the impulse responses for real revenues vary across 
sectors. The financials sector has the largest initial response, which is consistent with 
findings in the literature. In part, the positive response may reflect the underlying strong 
economy that historically proceeds any monetary tightening by the Fed. The logic behind 
this result is somewhat intuitive. During periods of strong economic activity, borrowers 
have lower default rates, banks have higher returns from investment activities, and 




 The real estate sector also has a positive initial response to the interest rate shock; 
however, the sector’s cumulative response quickly dissipates and becomes insignificant 
after two quarters. Just as with financials, the sector’s positive response may reflect the 
underlying strong economy that historically proceeds monetary tightening. Additionally, 
the Fed has historically raised rates gradually over a series of periods. If borrowers 
anticipate that more rate hikes are likely to follow, they may have an initial rush to borrow, 
followed by a sharp decline. 
 Next, we consider the consumer discretionary sector’s negative revenue response. 
As shown in Table 3.1, this sector includes automobiles and other durable goods alike. 
This negative response somewhat undercuts the previous narrative. However, this 
sector’s short-term demand is historically more elastic than that of the real estate sector. 
A more elastic demand may drive companies to cut margins, explaining the initial 
decrease in revenue. 
Beyond the impulse response graphs, we examine each sector’s sensitivity to 
interest rates at specific time-horizons. Figure 3.13 provides the 4-quarter cumulative 
impulse responses to an interest rate shock. This graph shows that the revenues for the 
financials, utilities, and energy sectors have large positive responses of over 2%. As 
shown in Figure 3.10(a-k), each of these sectors experienced large gains from 2004 to 
2008, approximately the same timeframe in which the Fed was swiftly raising the federal 
funds rate. These coinciding events explain the empirical results but expose the model’s 
sensitivity to unique significant historical events. 
 Finally, Figure 3.14 provides the 12-quarter cumulative impulse responses to an 
interest rate shock. While the utilities sector still has a large positive overall response, the 
energy sector’s response has dissipated slightly. More interestingly, we see that the 
financials sector shifted from a strongly positive response to a strongly negative one. 
Likewise, the real estate sector shows a decline of over 2%. We assess that the housing 
crisis and Great Recession likely explain these sharp declines. In the next subsection, we 






This subsection presents two alternative SVAR model specifications to estimate the 
impulse responses of corporate revenues to a one-period innovation in interest rates. The 
first approach uses the Wu-Xia (2016) shadow rates in place of the federal funds rate. 
The second approach controls for the effect of recessionary periods. The findings of these 
alternative approaches supplement our main results while also providing new insight into 
our model’s driving forces. 
First, consider the WU-Xia (2106) shadow rates, which better characterize the term 
structure of interest rates during the Great Recession. Figure 3.18(a-k) shows the impulse 
responses for the energy, materials, industrials, and consumer discretionary flip signs 
when compared against the main model. Interestingly, the financials sector still has an 
initial positive response, albeit much smaller in magnitude. 
Next, Figures 3.20-21 provide the 4-quarter and 12-quarter cumulative responses 
to a one-period innovation in the shadow rate. The 4-quarter cumulative responses reveal 
negative or insignificant revenue responses for all sectors, except the financials. The 12-
quarter cumulative responses show a positive response by the telecommunications 
services sector, while the financials sector flips to negative. 
The second alternative approach controls for the effect of recessionary periods. 
The specification follows from the main SVAR model but excludes the 2001 Recession 
and the Great Recession of 2008 periods. As shown in Figure 3.19(a-k), the energy, 
materials, industrials, and consumer discretionary sectors again flip signs when 
compared against the main model. 
Figures 3.22-23 provide the 4-quarter and 12-quarter cumulative responses to a 
one-period innovation in the non-recession periods. The 4-quarter cumulative responses 
reveal negative or insignificant revenue responses for all sectors, except consumer 
discretionary and industrials. The 12-quarter cumulative responses show positive 
responses by these same sectors, as well as the telecommunications services sector. 






In conclusion, this paper presents an SVAR model to estimate corporate revenues’ 
sensitivity to an increase in interest rates. Our findings reveal heterogeneity in real 
revenue responses across sectors. This paper makes three contributions to the literature. 
First, it provides additional evidence in support of the uneven response across sectors to 
monetary tightening. Second, our dynamic factor captures the output spillover effect 
across sectors. Third, in conjunction with our main model, the alternative approaches 
provide new insights into the channel through which monetary policy works. 
As the United States nears the hopeful end of the COVID-19 pandemic, 
policymakers look ahead to the new economic reality. In this paper’s background section, 
we lay out a detailed story of the U.S. economy’s course for the coming years. Although 
the Fed is likely to keep the federal funds rate near zero for the foreseeable future, upward 
price pressure will eventually force the Fed to act swiftly and tighten monetary policy. 
 In this paper, we rely on an SVAR model to estimate the relationship between 
these variables. It provides an ideal framework for examining monetary policy 
relationships because we can control the interaction between variables. Our findings 
reveal a wide range of responses to a one-period interest rate shock. These include a 






Figure 3.1: U.S. Industry Output Change from 2019Q2 to 2020Q2 (%) 
 





Figure 3.3: A Comparison of U.S. Economic Recoveries 
 






Figure 3.5: U.S. Effective Federal Funds Rate 
 





Figure 3.7: Factor of Real Sector Output Spillover 
 















































































Figure 3.12(a-f): Real Revenue Cumulative Impulse  












Figure 3.12(g-k): Real Revenue Cumulative Impulse 





Figure 3.13: 4-Quarter Sensitivity of Real Revenues 
to a One Percent Interest Rate Shock (%) 
 
Figure 3.14: 12-Quarter Sensitivity of Real Revenues 





Figure 3.15: Wu-Xia Shadow Rate 
 
 
Figure 3.16: U.S. Real GDP 





Figure 3.17: U.S. Household Debt Service  


























Figure 3.18(a-f): Real Revenue Cumulative Impulse  
Responses to a One Percent Interest Rate Shock 












Figure 3.18(g-k): Real Revenue Cumulative Impulse 
Responses to a One Percent Interest Rate Shock 












Figure 3.19(a-f): Real Revenue Cumulative Impulse  
Responses to a One Percent Interest Rate Shock 












Figure 3.19(g-k): Real Revenue Cumulative Impulse 
Responses to a One Percent Interest Rate Shock 





Figure 3.20: 4-Quarter Sensitivity of Real Revenues 
to a One Percent Interest Rate Shock 
Supplemental: Wu-Xia Shadow Rates (%) 
 
Figure 3.21: 12-Quarter Sensitivity of Real Revenues 
to a One Percent Interest Rate Shock 





Figure 3.22: 4-Quarter Sensitivity of Real Revenues 
to a One Percent Interest Rate Shock 
Supplemental: No Recessions (%) 
 
Figure 3.23: 12-Quarter Sensitivity of Real Revenues 
to a One Percent Interest Rate Shock 





Table 3.1: GICS Sector and Industry Groups 
Sector Industry Group 
10 Energy 1010 Energy 
15 Materials 1510 Materials 
20 Industrials 2010 Capital Goods 
2020 Commercial & Professional Services 
2030 Transportation 
25 Consumer Discretionary 2510 Automobiles & Components 
2520 Consumer Durables & Apparel 
2530 Consumer Services 
2540 Media 
2550 Retailing 
30 Consumer Staples 3010 Food & Staples Retailing 
3020 Food, Beverage & Tobacco 
3030 Household & Personal Products 
35 Health Care 3510 Health Care Equipment & Services 
3520 Pharmaceuticals, Biotechnology & Life 
Sciences 
40 Financials 4010 Banks 
4020 Diversified Financials 
4030 Insurance 
45 Information Technology 4510 Software & Services 
4520 Technology Hardware & Equipment 
4530 Semiconductors & Semiconductor 
Equipment 
50 Telecommunication Services 5010 Telecommunication Services 
55 Utilities 5510 Utilities 












Table 3.2: Real Revenues by Industry 
Industry Obs. Mean S.D. Med. Min. Max. Skewness Kurtosis 
Energy 87 321.55 149.76 326.47 98.47 674.67 0.14 -1.10 
Materials 87 168.15 46.28 167.17 98.35 254.11 -0.01 -1.46 
Industrials 87 190.45 40.32 195.64 100.00 255.59 -0.28 -1.09 
Consumer Discretionary 87 224.12 65.16 215.87 100.00 371.20 0.20 -0.63 
Consumer Staples 87 199.85 60.84 203.80 98.28 364.77 0.11 -0.69 
Health Care 87 313.97 139.64 295.14 88.89 589.28 0.30 -0.91 
Financials 87 270.89 78.77 281.67 20.82 392.19 -0.81 0.27 
Information Technology 87 201.39 67.26 193.61 100.00 341.06 0.33 -1.16 
Telecommunication Services 87 334.56 113.12 401.87 100.00 498.09 -0.36 -1.22 
Utilities 87 197.76 47.17 205.46 -30.95 375.80 -1.06 8.24 
Real Estate 87 785.25 538.95 800.48 81.09 1983.35 0.42 -0.80 














Table 3.3: Debt to Equity by Sector 
Industry Obs. Mean S.D. Med. Min. Max. Skewness Kurtosis 
Energy 87 1.39 0.68 1.18 0.58 4.02 1.84 3.36 
Materials 87 1.99 0.41 2.09 1.18 2.79 -0.31 -0.93 
Industrials 87 4.10 0.74 4.05 2.73 5.77 0.18 -0.65 
Consumer Discretionary 87 3.13 0.58 2.96 2.09 4.70 0.86 0.75 
Consumer Staples 87 2.15 0.30 2.14 1.52 2.99 0.16 -0.27 
Health Care 87 3.31 0.55 3.37 2.23 4.40 -0.14 -0.96 
Financials 87 25.00 6.23 24.78 11.20 42.71 0.33 0.32 
Information Technology 87 3.70 0.81 3.56 2.20 6.23 0.46 -0.12 
Telecommunication Services 87 4.10 1.29 3.98 1.12 7.71 0.63 1.07 
Utilities 87 4.87 1.34 4.55 2.87 9.89 1.20 2.42 
Real Estate 87 7.02 1.26 7.02 3.57 9.37 -0.31 0.05 















Amiti, Mary, Itskhoki, Oleg, and Konings, Jozef. “Importers, Exporters, and Exchange 
Rate Disconnect.” American Economic Review 104 (July 2014), 1942-78. 
Anderson, Richard K., and Moroney, John R. “Morishima Elasticities of Substitution with 
Nested Production Functions.” Economics Letters, Elsevier 42 (1993),159-66. 
Armington, Paul. “A Theory of Demand for Products Distinguished by Place of 
Production.” International Monetary Fund Staff Papers, XVI (1969), 159-78. 
Arrow, Kenneth J., Chenery, Hollis B., Minhas, Bagicha S., and Solow, Robert M. 
“Capital-Labor Substitution and Economic Efficiency.” The Review of Economics 
and Statistics 43 (1961), 225-50. 
Atkeson, Andrew, and Burstein, Ariel. “Pricing-to-Market, Trade Costs, and International 
Relative Prices.” American Economic Review 98 (December 2008), 1998-2031. 
Auer, Raphael A., and Schoenle, Raphael S. “Market Structure and Exchange Rate Pass-
Through.” Journal of International Economics 98 (January 2016), 60-77. 
Backus, David K., and Kehoe, Patrick J. “International Evidence on the Historical 
Properties of Business Cycles.” American Economic Review 82 (September 
1992), 864-88. 
Ball, Laurence, and Romer, David. “Real Rigidities and the Non-Neutrality of Money.” The 
Review of Economic Studies 57 (April 1990), 183–203. 
Barakchian, Mahdi, S., and Crowe, Christopher. “Monetary Policy Matters: Evidence 
From New Shocks Data.” Journal of Monetary Economics 60 (2013), 950-66. 
Bernanke, Ben S., Boivin, Jean, and Eliasz, Piotr. “Measuring the Effects of Monetary 
Policy: A Factor-Augmented Vector Autoregression (FAVAR) Approach”. Quarterly 
Journal of Economics 120 (2005), 387-422. 
Berman, Nicolas, Philippe, Martin, and Mayer, Thierry. “How do Different Exporters React 
to Exchange Rate Changes?” Quarterly Journal of Economics 127 (2012), 437-92. 
Bernard, Andrew B., Eaton, Jonathan, Jensen, J. Bradford, and Kortum, Samuel (2003) 
“Plants and Productivity in International Trade.” American Economic Review 93 
(September 2003), 1268-90. 
Blanchard, Olivier J., and Quah, Danny. “The Dynamic Effects of Aggregate Demand and 
Supply Disturbances.” American Economic Review 79 (September 1989), 655-73. 
Bodnar, Gordon M., Dumas, Bernard, and Marston, Richard C. “Pass-Through and 




Calvo, Guillermo A. “Staggered Prices in a Utility-Maximizing Framework.” Journal of 
Monetary Economics 12 (September 1983), 383-98. 
Campa, José M., and Goldberg, Linda S. “Exchange Rate Pass-Through into Import 
Prices.” Review of Economics and Statistics 87 (November 2005), 679-90. 
Clarida, Richard, Galí, Jordi, and Gertler, Mark. “A Simple Framework for International 
Monetary Policy Analysis.” Journal of Monetary Economics 49 (2002), 879-904. 
Cochrane, John H., and Piazzesi, Monkia. “Bond Risk Premia.” American Economic 
Review 95 (March 2005), 138-60. 
Dedola, Luca, and Lippi, Francesco. “The Monetary Transmission Mechanism: Evidence 
From the Industries of Five OECD Countries.” European Economic Review 49 
(2005, 1543-69. 
Dixit, Avinash K., and Stiglitz, Joseph E. “Monopolistic Competition and Optimum Product 
Diversity.” American Economic Review 67 (June 1977), 297-308. 
Dornbusch, Rüdiger. “Expectations and Exchange Rate Dynamics.” Journal of Political 
Economy 84 (December 1976), 1161-76. 
————. “Exchange Rates and Prices.” American Economic Review 77 (September 
1987), 647-66. 
Feenstra, Robert C., Gagnon, Joseph E., and Knetter, Michael M. “Market Share and 
Exchange Rate Pass-Through in World Automobile Trade.” Journal of International 
Economics 40 (February 1996), 187-207. 
Feenstra, Robert C., Luck, Philip, Obstfeld, Maurice, and Russ, Katheryn. “In Search of 
the Armington Elasticity.” Review of Economics and Statistics 100 (March 2018), 
135-50. 
Feenstra, Robert C., and Taylor, Alan M. International Economics. 4th ed. New York, NY: 
Worth Publishers (2017). 
Froot, Kenneth, and Klemperer, Paul. “Exchange Rate Pass-Through When Market 
Share Matters.” American Economic Review 79 (September 1989), 637-54. 
Galí, Jordi, and Monacelli, Tommaso. “Monetary Policy and Exchange Rate Volatility in a 
Small Open Economy.” Review of Economic Studies 72 (2005), 707-34. 
Gopinath, Gita, and Rigobon, Roberto. “Sticky Boarders.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 
123 (2008), 531-75. 
Gopinath, Gita, and Itskhoki, Oleg. “Frequency of Price Adjustment and Pass-Through.” 
The Quarterly Journal of Economics 125 (March 2010), 675-727. 
Hardy, Godfrey H., Littlewood, John E., and Pólya, George H. Inequalities. 1st ed. 




Helpman, Elhanan, and Krugman, Paul R. Market Structure and International Trade. 1st 
ed. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press (1985). 
Hillberry, Russell H., and Hummels, David. “Trade Elasticity Parameters for a Computable 
General Equilibrium Model.” In Handbook of Computable General Equilibrium 
Modeling, edited by Dixon, Peter B., and Jorgenson, Dale W., 1st ed., vol. 1, Ch. 
18 (2013), 1213–69. Elsevier. 
Jansen, Dennis W., Kishan, Rudy P., and Vacaflores, Diego E. “Sectoral Effects of 
Monetary Policy: The Evidence From Publicly Traded Firms.” Southern Economic 
Journal 79 (2013), 946-70. 
Keynes, John Maynard. A Tract on Monetary Reform. London: Macmillan and Co., 
Limited (1923). 
Klenow, Pete, and Willis, Jonathan. “Sticky Information and Sticky Prices.” Journal of 
Monetary Economics 54 (October 2006), 79-99. 
Kimball, Miles S. “Precautionary Saving in the Small and in the Large.” Econometrica 58 
(January 1990), 53-73. 
————. “The Quantitative Analytics of the Basic Neomonetarist Model.” Journal of 
Money, Credit and Banking 27 (November 1995), 1241-1277. 
Kreinin, Mordechai E. “The Effect of Exchange Rate Changes on the Prices and Volume 
of Foreign Trade (L'effet Des Modifications Du Taux De Change Sur Les Prix Et 
Le Volume Du Commerce Extérieur) (El Efecto De Las Variaciiones Del Tipo De 
Cambio Sobre Los Precios y El Volumen Del Comercio Exterior).” Staff Papers 
(International Monetary Fund), 24 (July 1977), 297–329. 
Krugman, Paul R. “Pricing to Market When the Exchange Rate Changes.” In Real-
Financial Linkages among Open Economies, edited by Sven W. Arndt and J. David 
Richardson. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press (1987). 
Kydland, Finn E., and Prescott, Edward C. “Time to Build and Aggregate Fluctuations.” 
Econometrica 50 (November 1982), 1345-70. 
Litterman, Robert. “Forecasting with Bayesian Vector Autoregressions: Five Years of 
Experience.” Journal of Business and Economic Statistics 4 (1986), 25-38. 
Lucas, Robert Jr. “Econometric Policy Evaluation: A Critique.” Carnegie-Rochester 
Conference Series on Public Policy 1 (1976), 19-46. 
Malenbaum, Michael. “Essays on Exchange Rate Pass-Through.” CUNY Academic 
Works (2015). 
Matsuyama, Kiminori and Ushchev, Philip. “Beyond CES: Three Alternative Cases of 
Flexible Homothetic Demand Systems.” Social Science Research Network 




McCallum, John. “National Borders Matter: Canada-U.S. Regional Trade Patterns.” 
American Economic Review 85 (June 1995), 615-23. 
Melitz, Marc J., and Ottaviano, Gianmarco I. P. “Market Size, Trade, and Productivity.” 
Review of Economic Studies 75 (2008), 295-316. 
Nakamura, Emi, and Steinsson, Jón. “Lost in Transit: Product Replacement Bias and 
Pricing to Market.” American Economic Review, 102 (December 2012), 3277-316. 
Naknoi, Kanda. “Exchange Rate Pass-Through and Market Structure in a Multi-Country 
World.” Working Paper (October 2015). 
Peersman, Gert, and Smets, Frank. “The Industry Effects of Monetary Policy in the Euro 
Area.” The Economic Journal 115 (2005), 319-42. 
Pesaran, Mohammad, and Shin, Yongcheol. “Generalized Impulse Response Analysis in 
Linear Multivariate Models.” Economics Letters, Elsevier 58 (January 1998), 17-
29. 
Obstfeld, Maurice, and Rogoff, Kenneth. “Exchange Rate Dynamics Redux.” Journal of 
Political Economy 103 (June 1995), 624-60. 
————. “The Six Major Puzzles in International Macroeconomics: Is There a Common 
Cause?” NBER Working Papers 7777, National Bureau of Economic Research 
(2000). 
Ottaviano, Gianmarco, Tabuchi, Takatoshi, and Thisse, Jacques-François. 
“Agglomeration and Trade Revisited.” International Economic Review 43 (May 
2002), 409-35. 
Penning, Steven. “Pass-Through of Competitors’ Exchange Rates to U.S. Import and 
Producer Prices.” Journal of International Economics 105 (March 2017), 41-56. 
Ravn, Morten O. “Consumption Dynamics and Real Exchange Rates.” London Business 
School Economics Discussion Paper (2001). 
Romer, Christina D., and Romer, David H. “A New Measure of Monetary Shocks: 
Deviation and Implications.” America Economic Review 94 (2004), 1055-84. 
Rotemberg Julio J., and Woodford, Michael. “Interest Rate Rules in an Estimated Sticky 
Price Model.” NBER Chapters, in: Monetary Policy Rules (1999), 57-126. 
Schürenberg-Frosch, Hannah. “We Could Not Care Less About Armington Elasticities–
But Should We?” Ruhr Economics Papers 594 (November 2015). 
Slanicay, Martin. “Some Notes on Historical, Theoretical, and Empirical Background of 
DSGE Models.” Review of Economic Perspectives 14 (June 2014), 145-64. 




Swanson, Eric T. "Risk Aversion and the Labor Margin in Dynamic Equilibrium Models." 
American Economic Review, 102 (June 2012), 1663-91. 
Van Ark, Bart, and Monnikhof, Erik. “Size Distribution of Output and Employment: A Data 
Set for Manufacturing Industries in Five OECD Countries, 1960s-1990.” OECD 
Economics Department Working Papers 166, OECD Publishing, Paris (1996). 
Walsh, C. E. Monetary Theory and Policy. 3rd ed. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press (2010). 
Walsh, C. E., and Ravenna, Federico. “Optimal Monetary Policy with the Cost Channel.” 
Journal of Monetary Economics 53 (2006), 199-216. 
Wu, J.C., and Xia, F.D. “Measuring the Macroeconomic Impact of Monetary Policy at the 
Zero Lower Bound.” Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 48 (2016), 253-91. 
Yang, Jiawen. “Exchange Rate Pass-Through in U.S. Manufacturing Industries.” Review 
of Economics and Statistics 79 (1997), 97-104. 
